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The decision of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest'
requires little introduction. Employing a legal theory first suggested
by Professors Coons, Clune, and Sugarman in Private Wealth and Pub-
lic Education,2 the court declared unconstitutional the method by
which public education is financed in California. Several courts have
followed Serrano,3 and the decision of one, a three-judge federal court
in Texas,4 is now before the Supreme Court in San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez.5
The legal foundation of Rodriguez and Serrano is familiar if not
entirely clear: Laws involving "suspect classifications" and touching
"fundamental interests" must be justified by some "compelling" state
interest." Both courts held that the traditional system of school finance,
"t" Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. J. COONS, IV. CLUNE & S. SUGAUAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PU1LIC EDUCAnoN (1970).
3. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall,
No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972); Caldwell v. Kansas, No. 50616 (District
Ct. Kan., Aug. 30, 1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972);
cf. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School Dist. v. Hinkle,
491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972). But see Parker
v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Spano v. Bd. of Educ. of Lakeland Cent.
School Dist. #1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
At last report, suits were pending in 31 states. U.S. OffiCE OF EoUc.A oN TASK ForcE
ON SCHOOL FINANCE, ANALYSIS OF INTRASTATE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES (1972).
4. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972).
5. Oral argument was held on October 12, 1972. See 41 U.S.L.W. 71-1332 (October
17, 1972).
6. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H-AM. L. REV. 1065
(1968); Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural-
Law-Due Process Formula, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 716 (1969); Sager, Tight Little Islands:
Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969);
Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. R-v. 1355
(1971). The state has been required to meet a higher burden of justification (some-
times called a compelling state interest) than that required by the traditional "rational
relationship" test (an outgrowth of the "presumption of constitutionality") in cases where
the classification was held suspect, e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (ancestry);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race); and Graham v. Richardson, 403 US.
365 (1971) (alienage), and where the court has apparently regarded the interest affected by
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in its dependence on local property taxes, makes the "quality" of a
child's education (a fundamental interest) dependent on the wealth
of his school district (a suspect classification) and that the state inter-
ests of administrative and fiscal decentralization were attainable in
other ways and hence not compelling justifications for the system.' The
Rodriguez court further found that per pupil expenditures measure
educational quality, and consequently the decision prohibits school
finance systems which make district expenditures dependent on district
wealth.8
The decision thus speaks in the negative, specifying only which
forms of school finance are impermissible. Much of the considerable
doctrinal and empirical commentary on Rodriguez and Serrano has
sought to describe generally the systems the decisions would approve.
The conclusions usually have been that the states have great latitude in
fashioning complying systems, 10 and that many of these might be worse
for the urban poor than the status quo."
the challenged legislation particularly important or fundamental, e.g., Kramer v. Union
Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630 (1968) (right to travel). Although the Court once suggested in dicta that wealth
is a suspect classification, McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S. 802,
807 (1969), neither wealth nor ability to pay alone (i.e., without a fundamental interest)
have been expressly so held, and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), seems to stand
for an unmistakable though implicit rejection of such a claim. But see Note, The
Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81
YALE L.J. 61, 76 (1971). The Court has seemingly indicated, however, that when the In.
terest affected is fundamental a wealth or ability to pay classification may become
suspect. E.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to appeal and wealth);
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting and wealth). It has
been suggested that these cases reflect a "sliding scale" approach to Equal Protection
that somehow combines the degree of "suspectness" and the fundamentality of the right
to determine whether the threshold has been reached to invoke the stricter standard
of review. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra, at 1130.32. See also
Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L.
REv. 7, 36-37 (1969).
7. 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-84.
8. The Rodriguez court does not expressly consider the relationship between ex-
penditures and educational quality. There is no mention in the opinion of any measure
of educational quality except expenditures, however, and there is no possible referent
in the opinion except per pupil expenditures for the court's ruling that the state can-
not "make the quality of public education a function of wealth .... ." Id. at 285
(emphasis added). See pp. 441-46 for a more extended treatment of this question.
9. For a comprehensive list of the legal literature, see Note, A Statistical Analysis
of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE LJ.
1303 n.2 (1972).
10. E.g., Coons, Chine & Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REV. L. SL Soc.
AcrioN 111, 115 (1971); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A
Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504, 51-19
(1972); Ridenour and Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance,
20 KANs. L. REV. 213, 221-26 (1972); Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A
Model Legislative Response, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACnoN 123 (1971); Comment, The
Aftermath of Serrano: The Strict Scrutiny Approach and the Viability of Property Tax
Financing for Public Educational Systems, 17 ViLL. L. REV. 928, 951 (1972).
11. See, e.g., Carrington, On Equalitarian Overzeal: A Polemic Against the Local
School Property Tax Cases, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUM 232, 243.44; Goldstein, Interdistrict
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This article, by contrast, seeks to discern which of the legally per-
missible systems are politically likely. Should Rodriguez be affirmed
-a result assumed here merely for expositional convenience-this arti-
cle should have application in every state. If Rodriguez is reversed,
there would remain many similar state constitutional claims and the
possibility that the legislatures may on their own move to revise school
finance. 12 If the Court reverses, this article should be read as a criticism,
though a qualified one, of some of the kinds of thinking that will likely
have led to the reversal-the fears of precipitating a constitutional cri-
sis by foisting impossible tax increases on the public, of disadvantaging
cities, or of embroiling the Court in a morass of nonjusticiable issues.
One might, of course, oppose affirmance in Rodriguez for still other
reasons. Such opposition might be informed, for example, by a view of
the "proper" role of the Court based on political theory, by a historical
view of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, or by a general
concern for principled doctrinal development. These concerns are by
and large outside the scope of this article. Our task here is to under-
stand the revenue impact of an affirmance in Rodriguez, the likely re-
sulting political pressures, and the institutional changes and legal issues
that will consequently become crucial in a post-Rodriguez future.
Given the ambiguity of Rodriguez and the complexity of educational
politics, the impact of the decision cannot be deduced from its words
as if these were tea leaves. Dire predictions, as in the Appellant's brief
Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 504, 526 (1972); Kirp & Yudof, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YALE
REv. L. & Soc. Acrto 143, 145-46 (1971); Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School
Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE 1.J. 1303 (1972); cf.
Moynihan, Solving the Equal Educational Opportunity Dilemma: Equal Dollars Is Not
Equal Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUMs 259, 260-62.
12. Of the Serrano-Rodriguez type cases now pending, thirty-four arc based on state
as well as federal grounds, and twenty-nine of these on state equal protcction clauses.
U.S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION TASK FORCE ON SCIHOOL FINANCE, ANALYSIS OF IN-MASTATE
SCHOOL FINANCE COURT CAsEs (1972). Several of the decisions to date either suggest or
expressly hold that the school finance system is unconstitutional under state constitu-
tional provisions as well as the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 596n.11, 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609n.ll (1971).
For a discussion of the California Supreme Court's probably intentional obfuscation of
the state constitutional issue as "another step in a continuing pas de deux between ie
California and United States Supreme Court,' see Coons, Clune & Sugarman, A First
Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REV. L. & Soc. ACTION 111, 112 (1971) (footnote omitted).
In the New Jersey case, the court held the system invalid under a state constitutional
requirement of a "thorough" school system. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223,
268-69, 287 A.2d 187, 211 (1972). Supplemental opinion at 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d
569 (1972). The Wyoming case, though presenting a modified form of the issue, also
turned in part on a finding of state unconstitutionality. SwCetwater County Planning
Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Wyo. 1971), juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1030
(Wyo. 1972). See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 874 (D. Minn. 1971);
Spano v. Bd. of Educ., 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
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in Rodriguez,13 of what "will" happen are not persuasive without an
indication of political probabilities and careful attention to the doc-
trinal boundaries the decision creates for the political process.
It will be argued here that a strict rule of per pupil expenditure
equality would be not only unfortunate for its social results but politi-
cally infeasible as well. Political forces will press for continued and sub-
stantial district expenditure disparities. Because the disparities de-
manded may well, like those today, correlate with district wealth, the
problem arises of accommodating these political pressures within the
ambiguous mandate of Rodriguez. Possible doctrinal accommodations,
centering on the concept of district differences in the "cost of educa-
tion," will therefore be discussed. It will be suggested that, though
the issues will often be difficult, the task of reconciling Rodriguez with
reality is not impossible, and more importantly, that the decision leaves
the courts great discretion in this assignment. In this regard, one of
our purposes is to suggest that the courts will not be obliged to carry
the full burden of "enforcing" Rodriguez.
Needless to say, such political speculation is largely a series of in-
formed guesses. This article attempts to focus the discussion by concen-
trating on the probable impact of Rodriguez on teachers and their or-
ganizations, and on the institution of collective bargaining between
teachers and public bodies. Of course, "education" involves more than
this, but the focus seems appropriate for several reasons. First, in ad-
dressing the distribution of funds for public education, and particu-
larly the existing district disparities in expenditures per pupil,14 the
13. Appellants, after arguing the practical effects of Rodriguez are irrelevant,
nonetheless proceed "in the interest of completeness" to note "some of the consequences
that would follow from affirmance of the decision below." They argue that affirmance
would require Texas to either raise $2.4 billion to equalize all districts at the expenditure
level of one near the top, or flatly equalize all districts at the current state average.
They then suggest, relying chiefly upon the Urban Institute Study which provides one
of the chief empirical bases for this article, that cities will be hurt by the decision. Brief
for Appellants at 39-42, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 406 U.S.
966 (1972).
14. Specifying, with any precision, the dimensions of intra-state per pupil expendi-
ture disparities is impossible, since different studies and reports often show somewhat
different figures. A recent study prepared for the President's Commission on School
Finance shows that in roughly seventy-five percent of the states the ratio of the highest
to lowest spending district is approximately three to one. A report for the Senate Select
Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity has similar findings for fifty.six percent
of the states. Both studies demonstrate inequalities far in excess of three to one in
particular states. (In Texas, the locus of Rodriguez, the former study shows a hlgh.low
ratio of fifty-six to one and the latter of twenty to one.) High-low ratios naturally
reflect aberrational districts, and the range of variation among more typical districts
in most states is usually considerably less. Within the fifth to ninety-fifth percentiles
in school district spending, according to the President's Commission study, the ratio
of the maximum to minimum is approximately two to one or less in three quarters
of the states. (Texas, though still higher than the average state, drops to a 2.8 to
one ratio.) Within the tenth through ninetieth percentiles, the maximum to minimum
ratio is roughly two to one or less in all but four of the states, and 1.5 or less to one
412
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decisions are to a large extent about teachers. Approximately fifty-five
percent of current operating costsla are for teacher salaries, that figure
increasing to roughly sixty-five percent when fringe benefits are in-
cluded.' 6 More importantly the disparities in expenditures appear to
be largely explained by variations in teacher salaries.1 7 Second, teacher
organizations are in many states (and particularly in the heavily urban
ones) large and powerful lobbies which will undoubtedly influence
in approximately half. (Texas is 2.1 to one). STAFF REPORr, TIE PRsEIo'r's Co. mtssox
ON SCHOOL FINANCE, 2 REVIEW OF EXitrING STATE SCHOOL FINANCE PR;.4AMs, Docu. %sE-
TATION OF DISPARITIES IN TIlE FINANCING OF PUBLIC ELEMF_"%TARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL
SYsrmSs-3Y STATE, 1971, at 13; U.S. SENATE SELECT CO.MMrTTEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY AND INEQUITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCE (Com. Print. 1972), 8-9.
15. It is not clear if Serrano and Rodriguez use only current operating expenditures
as the measure of "per pupil expenditures." Rodrigue: specifies that its holding "shall
have prospective application only" and shall "in no way affect the validity, incon-
testibility . . .of any presently outstanding bond," thus suggesting that prospectively
the holding applies to capital costs as well. 337 F. Supp. at 286. See also I CAL. SENATE
SELEcT COMMITEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCE, FINAL REPORT (1972); J. CooNs, W.
CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PU13LIC EDUCATION 151, 251-52 (1970).
This article does not consider, except where expressly noted, the capital cost impli-
cations of Serrano and Rodriguez. Its speculations and predictions are by and large
based on current operating expenditure data, which are generally chosen as the most
meaningful measure of comparability in school district spending. But see note 38 infra.
The figure includes the following: salaries of principals, supervisors, and teachers: other
instructional expenditures; expenses for administration, transportation, plant operation
and maintenance; supplies, library, clerical staff, textbooks, health, food service. at-
tendance services, and teacher benefits and social security. UmAN INsTrITT, PuttLe
SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 108 (1972).
Data on capital costs are not readily available in a form that makes them useful
for comparative analysis. See URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PREsENT DISPARI-
TIES AND FISCAL ALTERLNATIVES 38 n.9 (1972); I CAL. SENATE SELECT CoM.I.trrrEE ON SCIIOOL
DISRIar FINANCE FINAL REPORT 70-71 (1972). One study, which finds that capital outla)s
in 1969-1970 amounted to approximately nineteen percent of the total school budget
nationally, may give us a very rough notion of their order of magnitude. FINANCING
PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL FACILITIES IN TIlE UNITED STATES (National
Educational Finance Project Special Study No. 7, June 1970). See also NATIONAL C-ENTr
FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EI)CATION AND WELFARE; FI-
NANCES OF LARGE-CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMSS A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 48.49 (1971).
16. The largest proportion of instructional expenditures by far is teacher salaries.
URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL- FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATWES
81 (1972). Of the states in this study, New Hampshire and New York differ by up to
five percent from the overall estimate that fifty-five percent of current budget is for
teacher salaries (sixty-five percent when benefits are included). Other states are much
closer to the Urban Institute estimate. Id. at 82.
17. For a discussion of the dimensions of intra-state per pupil expenditure dispari-
ties see note 14 supra. The Urban Institute sample showed a relatively small amount of
variation on non-instructional expenditures. Plant operation costs and (to a lesser x-
tent) transportation costs are the most variable components of variation. Other budget
elements (generally included in the instructional budget) vary considerably, but are a
small part of total spending examples are principal salaries, supplies, and textbooks.
Id. at 81-84.
A pair-wise comparison of expenditure differentials between central city school dis-
tricts and slow-growth suburbs, fast-growth suburbs, and rural districts showed that
the largest source of variation in current expenditures, both absolutely (in dollars) and
relatively (as a source of the difference between the district types) was teacher salaries.
id. at 86. In other words, teacher salaries largely explain interdistrict disparities, and
districts' decisions about expenditures must largely reflect teacher salaries. See also
NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, FINANCES OF LRGE-CrTY SClOOL SYSrTEMls: A CO.MPARATIVE ANALYSIS 52-53
(1971).
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the restructuring of educational finance under Rodriguez.'8 Third, to
assess whether Serrano or Rodriguez threaten local autonomy in edu-
cational policy, as opponents of the decisions allege, one must consider
the effect of the decisions on the power and structure of teacher organi-
zations and their collective bargaining, for these are already major fac-
tors in school governance and important constraints on the autonomy
of local boards of education. 19 Finally, teachers are the most important
resource in the educational process 20 and are thus crucial to the ulti-
mate goal of Rodriguez: equal "quality" education. A key question,
therefore, is whether the decisions will enable "poor" districts to hire
teachers of equal quality and quantity as "rich" districts.
I. The Fundamental Conflicts
Under Rodriguez, a system of school finance will pass muster only
if district per pupil expenditures do not depend on district wealth.
Two fundamental systems have been proposed to satisfy this require-
ment: full state funding, where the state levies all necessary taxes and
disburses equal amounts per pupil to each district;21 and power equali-
zation, where the state's disbursements depend on the tax rate, but not
the tax base, of the recipient district, the state redistributing to "poor"
districts the excess revenue generated from rich districts.2 2 It is, how-
18. See, e.g., NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH REPORT 1970-RIO, HIGI
SPOTS IN STATE SCHOOL LEGISLATION, JANUARY 1 - AUGUST 31, 1970 for a state by state
description of the National Education Association's lobbying goals and achievements IIn
state legislation from January I to August 31, 1970; R. BRAUN, TEACHERS AND 1OWEtR,
THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (1972) for an impassioned ac-
count of the growth of the American Federation of Teachers by one who views the power
of teachers as a clear and present danger to education in this country. See also A.
ROSENTHAL, PEDAGOGUES AND POWER: TEACHER GROUPS IN SCHOOL POLITICS (1969) for a
more systematic study of the nature and impact of teachers' organizations in large cities.
19. See pp. 424-27, 437.
20. Common sense supports this. Social science, while indicating that all school re-
sources have less influence on student performance than is commonly believed, still
suggests that teachers are the most important resource. See notes 144 & 159 infra.
21. See, e.g., I CAL. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCE 63 et seq.
(1972); Coons, Clune and Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALEl REV. L. &
Soc. ACTION I11 (1971); Wise School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative
Response, 2 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 123 (1971).
22. Under this system, the legislature would specify the per pupil expenditure to
which every school district taxing at specified rates would be entitled. rile rate.ex-
penditure schedule might look as follows:






Each school district would choose its own rate, and every district taxing at the same rate
would be guaranteed by the state the same (scheduled) expenditure. The system need
not necessarily employ property taxation, although most discussions of power cqualiza-
414
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ever, important to understand that both systems go somewhat further
than Rodriguez requires. Under that decision, disbursements may de-
viate from either strict per pupil equality (under full state funding) or
strictly equal per pupil expenditures for equal tax rates (under power
equalization), so long as the deviations do not make expenditures a
"function" of the differential wealth of districts. 23 Rodriguez may
therefore permit disparities reflecting a legislative preference for cer-
tain students or programs, or differences in the "cost" of education to
different districts.
Thus, while mandating some reform of school finance, Rodriguez
and Serrano leave the states a wide range of choice. However, three
political factors considerably narrow the field. First, under the de-
cisions, state legislatures, rather than local authorities, will largely
determine the amount of tax revenue (aside from federal aid) available
for public education. In predicting the nature of future school finance,
we must therefore look to the legislatures and the political interests
and attitudes which influence them. Second, few legislatures will move
to enact either full state funding or power equalization in their pure
forms, for both would work to the disadvantage of certain groups whose
political influence and equitable claims are likely to be irresistible.
Third, state legislatures will thus be under unremitting pressure to
create or validate district expenditure disparities by allowing inter-
district "cost" differentials or granting categorical or special program
aid.
A. An Increased Role for State Legislatures
While all state governments now provide some aid to public educa-
tion,24 a majority of educational expenditures come from local prop-
don assume a property tax. But see note 48 infra. For districts whose wealth base (total
assessed value, if the property tax is used) is insufficient to generate the scheduled
amount per pupil, the state would make up the difference. Districts whose wealth
bases yield more than the scheduled amount would have to pay the difference to the
state for redistribution to poorer districts. See generally J. Coos, I. CLuNE & S.
SUCARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUcATION (1970).
23. The Rodriguez court noted that its holding,
does not involve the Court in the intricacies of affirmatively requiring that expendi-
tures be made in a certain manner or amount. On the contrary, the state may adopt
the financial scheme desired so long as the variations in wealth among the govem.
mentally chosen units do not affect spending for the education of any child.
337 F. Supp. at 284. See also Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 876-77 (D. Minn.
1971); J. CooNs, IV. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WVALTII AND PUBLIC EDucAToI, 232-
54, 309-11 (1970). Post-Serrano commentators have reached similar conclusions. E.g.,
Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the De-
velopinent of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CAL. L. REV. 720, 752-56 (1972). We later
argue that this problem is not so simple as many appear to think. See pp. 439-58 infra.
24. For a description of the history and operauon of state educational aid, and a
criticism of current systems, see J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGAPIAN, PRIVATE IVEALTM A 5D
PuBuc EDuCATioN 38-197 (1970).
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erty taxes. In 1971-72, fifty-one percent of the educational revenues
raised in the nation were levied by local districts; forty-two percent
came from state taxes; the remaining seven percent, from the federal
government.2  But these averages conceal great variations among states
and districts: The state aid percentage of non-federal educational
revenues ranged from ten percent in New Hampshire to ninety-seven
percent in Hawaii; within the states, the state-local breakdowns vary
significantly from district to district.20
After equalization, the determination of total educational revenue
will rest to a much greater extent with the state legislatures. Under full
state funding, they will determine the expenditure level for public
education and will set state tax rates accordingly. Under power equali-
zation, local tax rate choice would affect expenditures, but the level for
each permissible rate will again depend on the state legislature's selec-
tion of a rate-expenditure schedule. The legislature will determine the
acceptable minimum and maximum expenditure and the appropriate
expenditure increments for each local rate increase.27 It will decide
whether to finance the system by merely redistributing locally-raised
revenues among districts or by adding to the "pot" through state tax-
ation.2 8 The greater the reliance on state taxation, the more the power-
equalized system resembles full state funding.
20
B. Political Pressure for Expenditure Disparities
Assuming that non-federal revenue for public education does not in-
crease significantly in response to Serrano and Rodriguez, implemen-
tation of either of the "basic" reform plans will penalize districts that
currently spend more than the state per pupil average and those that
must pay above-average salaries to attract teachers. Equalization of per
pupil expenditures under full state funding would in the short run
probably force a reduction in teacher salaries and/or the number of
teachers employed in such districts. While in the long run, the "nor-
25. See, e.g., 49 NEA RESEARCH BULLETIN 53 (May 1971).
26. For inter-state comparisons, see NEA, RESEARCH REPORT 1971-R13, EsTIMATES OV
SCHOOL STATISTICS, 1971-72, at 34-35. Intra-state percentages will obviously vary greatly de-
pending upon the amount of expenditures raised by local taxation.
27. Obviously, the effect of any power-equalized system depends entirely on the legis-
lative rate-expenditure schedule. For example, if the expenditure increment increases
geometrically in relation to each rate increase, the system creates great incentive for high
spending. See note 22 supra.
28. See note 22 supra.
29. Imagine, for example, that under the rate-expenditure schedule a one percent
local property tax rate entitled the district to $1000 in per pupil expenditures, whereas
this tax rate yielded only $800 in the richest and $300 in the average district of the
state. Under such a schedule, the lion's share of educational revenue must come from
state taxation, as in no district will district-raised revenues cover expenditures.
416
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mal" growth of state tax revenues (as the economy grows) may make ab-
solute cutbacks unnecessary, 30 growth will not eliminate the relative
losses of high-wealth districts.31 Further, in both the short and long run,
currently high-spending districts would suffer an erosion of their pre-
sent power in competing for teachers in the statewide labor market. Fi-
nally, equalization of per pupil expenditures would aggravate the hir-
ing problems of many districts which must now pay above-average
salaries to attract teachers.
Enactment of pure power equalization would have similar effects. It
is true that under such a system high-spending districts could maintain
their expenditure levels by increasing their local tax rates. However,
since it is unrealistic to assume that the demand for per pupil expendi-
tures is completely inelastic in such districts,32 power equalization
would create some downward pressure on teacher hiring and salaries.
Similarly, pure power equalization would disadvantage districts facing
high teacher "costs."
These predictions, closely associating fiscal and teacher effects, are
justified by the available data. There are, today, very significant dis-
parities in teacher salaries per pupil from district to district.33 A recent
Urban Institute study, prepared for the President's Commission on
School Finance, found that, with the possible exception of aberration-
ally low- and high-spending districts, 34 "expenditures for teachers are
the major cause for . . . intra-state expenditure differentials." 33 We
30. According to the NEA, school revenue receipts increased 166% from 1961.62
through 1971-72, or at an average annual rate of 10.3%. though the actual year-by-year
increases were more sporadic (e.g., an increase of 17%, in 1967-68, and only 7A% in
1971-72). NEA, RESEARCH REPORT 1971-R13, ESTIMATES OF Sc HOOL STATISTICS, 1971-72. at
17. During 1961-66, the market value of real property increased by only 4.6% annually.
on the average. 2 U.S. BURAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF Govsuistrzcrs, 1967, TAxAntU
PROPRTY VALUES 11 (1968).
31. Depending on the state taxes chosen to finance revised systems, many or most of
the currently high spending-high property wealth districts would have a higher tax
yield by increasing their own tax rates and keeping the revenue, rather than pooling
tax resources with the state. See note 47 infra.
32. See notes 68 and 111 infra.
33. See note 17 supra, and notes 155-58 infra. For 1967-68 comparisons between state
average and large-city teacher salary per pupil, see NATIONAL CENTER FoR EDUCATIONAL
STATISTICS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WVELFARE: FINANCES OF LARGE-CITY
SCHOOL Sysm_ is: A CO.MPARATIVE ANALYSIS 52-53 (1971). Taking the eighty-five largest
districts in California in 1970-71 as an example, the median district paid an average
teacher salary of $10,840. Two-thirds of the systems are within a $1069 range around
the median, and one-third are beyond that range ($10,325 to $11,394). The highest
average teacher salary of the eighty-four systems was $12,485, and the lowest was $8,993.
I NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RESEARCH REPORT 1971-RS, 25Tit BIENNIAL SALARY
SURVEY OF PUBLIC-SCHOOL PROFESSIONAL PERSONNEL, at 48-50 (1971). See also I
CAL. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DIS'RICT FINANCE, FINAL REPORT 34 (1972).
34. URBAN IrsTIrrUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FIsCAL AL ER-
NATIVES 36 (1972).
35. URBAN INSrITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DispARTIES AND FSCA ALTE-
NATIVES 90, 91-101 (1972). See note 17 supra.
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shall later consider the causes of these variations, but for now it is
enough to note that teachers in presently high-spending districts will
very likely bear the brunt of any required reduction in their district's
expenditures. Of course a district could reduce expenditures to some
extent without affecting teachers by cutting back on school main-
tenance, buying less equipment or fewer books, and so forth. But such
operating expenditures are very difficult to manipulate and combined
represent but a relatively small percentage of total educational costs.30
Nor are such expenditures likely to be a matter of indifference to teach-
ers and their organizations (not to mention school administrators and
parents) since they affect teaching conditions. Thus, we can anticipate
that teacher organizations in currently high-spending districts will op-
pose the implementation of either of the basic reform finance sys-
tems. In this position, they will be allied with the parents and politi-
cians of those districts.
The strength of this coalition will naturally vary from state to state,
but it seems clear that it will have considerable political muscle, since
it will include wealthy suburban interests and often the large cities
where teacher organizations are particularly powerful. 37 The Urban
Institute, consistently with other studies, found that in 1969 the aver-
age "central city" revenue per pupil (excluding federal contributions)
in the states analyzed (California, Colorado, Delaware, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and Washington) ex-
ceeded the state average by $124 or approximately fifteen percent.38
36. For the Urban Institute sample states, non-salary instructional expenditures (in-
cluding clerical staff, supplies, textbooks, and library) varied very little from 3.5% to
9.0% of current operating expenditures, while total non-instructional costs ranged only
from 17.1% to 22.6% of current operating expenditures. URBAN INSTITUTE, PoULIC SCHOOL
FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 108 (1972). For a practical cor-
roboration of these statistical indications of non-manipulability, consider tile statement
of a New York school official, commenting upon a cut of sixty-five teachers. "We can
cut supplies and equipment, but the only place to go for large sums of money is the
teaching staff, where the average teacher has a salary and fringe benefits in the $12,000-
a-year range." N.Y. Times, May 11, 1972, at 1, col. 2. See also "Muddling Through In
the Year of the Crunch," N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, at 3, col. 4 describing the plight
of teachers in budget-reducing districts. Perhaps future capital outlays are more Inallipti-
lable, since a district presumably has some flexibility in timing the building of a new
school, although imprudent delays might send maintenance costs skyrocketing. '1oo
little is known about the dimensions and details of capital costs to enable reasonable
speculation. See note 15 supra.
37. While a judicial decision will undoubtedly alter the political environment, It
seems naive to expect that the interests which have thus far blocked school finance
reform will suddenly fade away. As Professors Kirp and Yudof have noted:
Those who have benefited from the existing system-wealthy suburbs, cities with
high tax bases-have been able to fend off proposed reforms, however cogently
urged. It is in their political interests to do so."
Kirp & Yudof, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YALE REV. OF LAW AlD SOCIAL ACTION
143 (1971).
38. URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTER-
NATIVES 43 (1972). Central cities are defined as those with a population of 250,000 or
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Similarly, separating slow growing ("rich") from fast growing ("poor")
suburbs indicates that the average per pupil revenue of the former is
$108 (thirteen percent) above the state average. 30
Moreover, at least some opponents of both "basic" reform finance
systems will also be able to marshal persuasive equitable claims. The
public school population in central cities is composed of a far higher
percentage of students from minority" and "poverty" families41 where
academic performance is typically poor.42 On the taxing side, any "re-
form" which would force such cities to subsidize education in other
parts of the state43 would appear highly inequitable.
44
It may be argued that we have overstated tie opposition to "re-
form" by assuming Serrano and Rodriguez will not lead to dramatic
more. We exclude federal revenue as its flow is not affected by Serrano and Rodrigue-
Including federal revenue, the central cities receive even more and the "rich" suburbs
slightly less than indicated in the text as compared with the state average. Since "reenue"
figures include some capital costs, they are not perfect for our purposes, see note 15
supra, but "expenditure" figures are not separated by government source, and in any
event they show the same pattern of variation. Id. at 85-90. An HEW study based on
1967-68 figures shows that a majority of eighty-seven large cities hase per pupil ex-
penditures above the state average; roughly two.thirds of them have per pupil reenues
(excluding federal contribution) above the state average. DEP.ARTNIL-r OF HEALTH, EDU-
CATION AND WELFARE: FINANCES OF LARGE-CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS: A COMPABA.TivE ANALYstsI
52-53 (1968). See also I Naw YORK STATE COMMISSION ON' TE QUALITY, COST AND FINANCE
OF ELEtENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION REPORT 2.63 (1972); THE URBAN INSTUmT,
PAYING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-IssuEs OF SCHOOL FINANCE IN CALIFORNIA 14-15 (1972).
39. URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: PRESENT Dist-ARITEs AND FISCA.L ALTER-
NATIVEs 43 (1972).
40. A Census Bureau national survey found that for metropolitan areas of 250,000 or
more in 1968, fifty-four percent of the students in designated poverty areas were black,
compared to ten percent of the students in non-poverty areas. Similarly thirty-two
percent of the public school enrollment in central cities was black, compared to six
percent of the suburban enrollment and seven percent of the non.metropolitan en-
rollment. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 190,
School Enrollment: October 1963 and 1967, at 18-22 (1969).
41. See note 171 infra. Compare ESEA per pupil grants to cities with state averages.
for 1967-68. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FINANCES OF LIsGE.Cr'y
SCHOOL SYmrsFss: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 52-53 (1968).
42. See, e.g., I NEW YORK STATE COMMIssION ON THE QUALITY, COST AND FINANCING OF
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION REPORT 1.28-1.58 (1972); Dyer, Some Thoughts
About Future Studies in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 399 (F. Mosteller & D.
Moynihan eds. 1972); Tyler, Investing in Better Schools, in AGE DA FOR T lE NAToN
207 (Gordon ed. 1968).
43. Many finance systems could have this effect. See note 47 in ra.
44. Apart from the obvious inequity of forcing cities, with concentrations of minority.
poor, and low achieving students, to subsidize other areas, there is the inequity caused
by the often-invoked, undoubtedly real, but little-understood phenomenon of "municipal
overburden." In its most general usage, municipal overburden refers to the well.known
fact that cities typically have considerably higher non-educational public expenditures
than other types of school districts. More particularly, the claim is that cities, quite
apart from any possible greater taste for public goods, have higher "public costs" chiefly
because of their relative concentrations of needy citizens, the influx of non-tax.pajing
visitors from suburbs and state mandated services. Thus, it is often argued, cdIes
have less effective capacity to finance education than other areas. As should be ob-
vious, measuring "municipal overburden" is very difficult, and what should "count" as
a higher cost for tax-policy purposes-like the comparable claim discussed at p. 422 that
some areas have higher education costs-is a normative not scientific question. We shall
not treat the municipal overburden problem in any depth. See note 151 infra.
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increases in the tax revenue devoted to education. 4 To this argument,
two answers seem appropriate. First, while increased revenue would
permit higher teacher salaries in all districts and would therefore ex-
pand the supply of teachers, currently high-spending districts will
nevertheless still lose their ability to outbid currently low-spending
districts for the "best" teachers; the districts would resent this loss of
competitive advantage and this displeasure would be multiplied to the
extent they have to pay higher salaries than other districts for teachers
of the same quality. Teacher organizations in currently high-spending
districts would presumably be similarly displeased by the relative de-
terioration of their salaries, when compared to salaries in currently
low-spending districts.
Second, there is no real reason to assume that tax revenues for edu-
cation will increase significantly in the wake of Rodriguez and Serrano.
If, as suggested below, state-level collective bargaining develops, long
run institutional pressure toward greater educational revenues may be
created. Whether those pressures will be successfully resisted is a sig-
nificant political question. The usual reasons advanced for a quick and
dramatic increase in educational revenues are not, however, per-
suasive. 46 First, it should not be assumed that the coalition opposed to
equalization will remain united in pressing for greater state educational
revenues. While teacher organizations in presently high-spending dis-
tricts would favor such increases, local citizens (and politicians) will be
less enthusiastic, as such increases would often force these citizens to
pay more in additional taxes than they would receive in increased state
disbursements. 47 Second, it should not be assumed that reform will
45. To equalize expenditures within each of the states at each state's ninety-fifth per-
centile would cost approximately $8.8 billion nationally; at the ninetieth percentile $6.2
billion; at the eightieth percentile, $3.7 billion; at the seventieth percentile, $2.6 billion.
II STAFF REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON SCHOOL FINANCE, REVIEW OF EXISTING
STATE SCHOOL FINANCE PROGRAMS 15 (1972). Total public school expenditures nationally
last year were roughly $42 billion. 49 NEA RESEARCH BULLETIN 53 (May 1971).
46. See, e.g., Finn & Leukorosky, Serrano v. the People, 54 COMMENTARY 68, 70 (Sep-
tember, 1972); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Finance: A Critical Analysis
of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L.R. 504, 526-27 (1972); Moynihan,
Solving the Equal Educational Opportunity Dilemma: Equal Dollars Is Not Equal
Opportunity, 1972 U. ILL. L. FORUM 259 (1972).
47. For example, the Fleischman Commission found that if New York State instituted
a statewide tax proportional to a district's share of total property and income and dis-
tributed the revenue proportionally to enrollment, New York City would pay out $1.41
in taxes for every dollar it received in school support. I NEv YORK STATE COMMISSION
ON THE QUALITY, COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION RIEI'ORT
2.39 (1972). An Urban Institute study for California found that if the state replaced the
local property tax with a statewide property tax, the rates would increase In central
cities (including Los Angeles and San Francisco), and the cities, which have thirty-seven
percent of the state's public school students would contribute nearly forty-five percent
of state school revenues for this tax. At the same time, if state funds were distributed
on an equal per pupil basis, expenditures per pupil would decline in central cities by
$85. URBAN INSTITUTE, PAYING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ISSUES OF SCHOOL FINANCE IN CALIFORNIA
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bring a shift to sales or income taxation, resulting in higher tax reve-
nues by making taxes less "visible" or more "progressive." A complete
shift from property4 s to sales or income taxation seems unlikely, given
the present strain on the two latter revenue sources in most states.40
The relative "visibility" of various taxes has never been measured; it is
not clear that property taxes are less progressive than many state sales
or income taxes; and it is difficult to know in each district how a mar-
ginal change in sales or income taxes will compare, in the voters' minds,
with marginal increases in educational expenditures. Finally, the com-
mon assumption that power equalization would increase statewide
revenues by forcing "rich" districts to tax themselves at a higher rate
to maintain expenditure levels is somewhat shortsighted: The system
would simultaneously permit "poor" districts to maintain expenditure
levels at reduced rates. The effect of these countervailing incentives
on total state tax revenues is extremely difficult to predict. Under
either full state funding or power equalization, some tax increases
may prove inevitable, but political pressures should keep these mini-
mal, and it seems far more likely that the legislatures will seek political
accommodation through the cost-differential and categorical and pro-
gram aid routes.
32-34 (1972). Another study found the same pattern in Delaware, Michigan. and Colorado.
URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVEs
126-31 (1972). Yet another study indicates that use of a proportional state income tax,
designed to replace the state's total local revenue raised by property taxation with
revenue distributed on an equal per pupil basis, would increase school taxes in
twenty-one of twenty-eight studied major cities and decrease expenditures in eighteen.
U.S. SENATE SELECT CoiM.rrrEE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNtY, 92d CONG., 2d SEss.,
INEQUITIES IN SCHOOL FINANCE. See also, Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303. 1337-40 (1972). Rural
districts may also be resistant to tax increases, though for somewhat different reasons.
See note 78 infra.
48. If property taxation continues as a significant source of educational revenue,
see note 49 infra, under either a fully state funded or power equalized system. states
will obviously have to assure the effective equalization of assessments throughout the
state. To assure comparability of assessments, the state will have either to assess cen-
trally, or establish or improve state boards of equalization. See generally UVDISO-Y
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIOxS, THE ROLE OF TIHE STATES IN SrRENGTHF%ING
THE PROPERTY TAx 40-46, 131-44 (1963); D. NETzER, ECONOICS or TntE PRoPsaY TAx
173-83 (1966); THE PROPERTY TAX AND Irs ADMINISTRATIoN (A. Lynn, Jr. ed. 1969). Cf.
Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (challenge to states failure to
assess all property at uniform ratio upheld on equal protection grounds).
49. Two of the major "quasi-official" school finance reform reports of last )ear
recommend continued reliance on property taxation as the major reienue source,
though, to be sure, they also urge special accommodation on both the tax and expendi-
ture side for low income families. See I NEw YoRK STATE Co.Btsso.' ON TiE QUALrITY,
COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION REPORT 2.26-2.37 (1972);
FINAL REPORT TO THE SENATE SELECT CosssirF ON SCHOOL DIsmar FINANCES 13-16 (Cal.
1972). The Urban Institute found that in California substitution of a state sales tax for
local school property taxes would require an additional five percent tax (from four to
nine percent), while substitution of an income tax would require a 125 percent increase
in that tax. URBAN LNsrrruTE, PAYING FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS, IssUEs OF SCitOOL FINANjcE IN
CALIrFORNA 31 (1972).
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C. The Attraction of "Cost" Differentials
To the extent that the courts can be persuaded that education "costs"
more in some districts than in others, deviations from strict per pupil
equality or equal expenditures for the same tax rate should be per-
mitted. Cost-differentials thus become a major vehicle for political
accommodation.50 Defining and measuring district differences in the
cost of education is, as we shall see, extraordinarily difficult.61 In gen-
eral, however, claims that education costs more in some districts have
one of two meanings: first, that some students or programs cost more
than others; or second, that the costs of buying teachers, equipment, or
other educational resources are greater in some districts than others.
Rodriguez, as we shall see, probably leaves the legislature consider-
able discretion in establishing educational priorities through categori-
cal and other special aid programs. Such aid can be used to compromise
political conflicts: Central city interests will press for compensatory
programs, special subsidies for vocational education and the like, while
the suburbs will seek special aid for "gifted" children, "exceptional
scholarship" programs, and special equipment and teachers in ad-
vanced academic fields. Legislative logrolling is likely in an effort to
balance such aid formulas.
The second type of "cost difference," the variable cost of educational
resources, is perhaps an even more malleable device for political ac-
commodation. It easily has a substantial enough basis in reality to
strike a responsive judicial chord, and once loosed it will not be easily
contained. Suburbs and cities will proffer a welter of high-cost claims
-some true, some false, some virtually impossible to appraise. The
"technical" and apparently neutral label of "cost-differentials" will
make them particularly appealing in both the political and judicial
processes; yet they may in fact conceal a welter of political concessions
and policy judgments.5 2 We shall return below to the conceptual and
doctrinal problems of both categorical aid and cost differentials for
Rodriguez and educational finance. First, however, we must examine
the probable evolution of teacher organizations and of collective bar-
50. See note 165 infra, for a discussion of cost-differentials in the Governor of Mich-
igan's proposals for school finance "equalization" (largely through full state funding).
51. See pp. 446-53.
52. The cost-differential justification for inter-district disparities is probably an
example of what Professor Lindblom has called "partisan analysis"-essentially the use
by interest groups of "scientific" analysis to persuade policy-makeirs to their point of
view. If "legitimate persuasion" really is at the core of interest-group politics, "scien-
tific" arguments and technical vocabularies become a major factor in influencing de-
cision-making. See C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROcEss 65-69 (1968).
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gaining in a political environment governed by the propositions just
suggested.
II. The Institutional Accommodation: Statewide
Collective Bargaining
In the previous section, it was suggested that the most likely short-
run response to Rodriguez will be the formation of a statewide lobby-
ing coalition which will attempt to resist the elimination of expendi-
ture disparities. The long-run prospect is, however, somewhat different.
Where the coalition includes some teacher organizations but excludes
others, the long run should see the formation of a relatively centralized
state teacher organization which will confront the state-and its citizens
-with a single set of demands. Though the short-run prognosis is for
lobbying and logrolling, with district interests closely identified, the
long-run should see decisions made in a relatively formal process of
statewide collective bargaining in which district interests will be more
submerged and through which district expenditure disparities will be
somewhat muted. Where the short-run political contest should be lim-
ited to funding and teacher salaries, this long-run collective bargaining
process may well assimilate many "non-monetary" issues often involv-
ing educational policy presently determined at the local level.
A. Toward Statewide Collective Bargaining
School governance is today largely a local matter. While public edu-
cation is in virtually all states the constitutional responsibility of the
state legislature 3 and school districts are merely "creatures" of the
state,54 local boards of education are commonly regarded as institu-
tions of local government55 No matter how detailed state statutory
53. See generally E. BOLMEIER, SCHOOL IN TIHE LECAL STRUCTrUE 63-77 (1968); N.
EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 27-46 (1971).
54. See, e.g., Lanza v. Wagner, 11 N.Y.2d 317, 326, 183 N.E.2d 670, 675 (1962), charac-
terizing local school districts and school boards as state agents "separate and distinct
from the city, created by the State for the purpose of carrying out a purely state func-
tion .... " In practice, however, school boards are generally perceived as units of local
government, and this ambiguity, often complicated by unclear "home rule" pro isions.
can result in complex legal-conceptual struggles among the city government, the school
district, and the state legislature on a wide variety of school matters. See, e.g., Board
of Educ. v. Town of Ellington, 151 Conn. 1, 193 A.2d 466 (1963); Lanza v. Wagner, 11
N.Y.2d 317, 183 N.E.2d 670 (1962); Blue v. Stockton, 355 P.2d 395 (Alaska 1960). See also
Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate Student Conduct
and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 373, 376-77 (1969). See
generally E. RUTTER & R. HAmkILTOv, THE LAw OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 107-27, 223-44 (1970);
N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 54-142 (1971).
55. For discussion of the local politics of education, see, e.g., L. IaNNACCONE, POLITICS
IN EDUCATION 82-98 (1967); R. BENDINER, TrE POLITICS OF SCHOOLS: A CuIS IN SEI.F-Gov-
ERNMENT (1969).
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and administrative regulation,"0 the local board of education is still
the basic unit of educational policy-making and administration.07 Most
notably, the major decisions on how much to spend for education are
made locally-usually by the school board though often with the ap-
proval of other municipal institutions or the electorate.0 8
It is therefore hardly surprising that teacher organizations-though
often involved in statewide lobbying-have concentrated their bargain-
ing efforts at the local level. Most states require or permit local boards
to engage in relatively formal bargaining with local teacher organiza-
tions.5° In some states, the organizations may only submit proposals
or "meet and confer" 60 with the boards; in others (including several of
the largest and most industrial states) the board is legally obliged, more
or less like private employers under the National Labor Relations Act,
to "bargain in good faith."0' Teachers typically choose their represen-
56. Virtually all states have created state agencies to tend to the state's interests in
education as defined by Statute. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1969). Some-
times the state constitution itself describes the state board. E.g., MiCH. CONST., art. 8, q 3.
See generally E. REUrER & R. HAMILTON, TIlE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 61-106 (1900).
57. Pursuant, typically, to broad authorizing legislation, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 10-220 (Supp. 1969), local school boards exercise wide discretion in hiring, firing,
and evaluating personnel, regulating students and teachers, setting curricular policy,
and so forth. For cases illustrating the scope of local board authority, see generally
E. REU-rER & R. HAMILTON, TlE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 107-65 (1970).
58. For a more than typically realistic sense of the varying degrees of school board
fiscal dependence or independence and the political dynamics of the budgetary process,
see H. JAMES, J. THOMAS & H. DYCK, WEALTH, EXPENDITURES AND DECISION-MAKING FOR
EDUCATION 143-77 (1963). See also R. GARVUE, MODERN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE 27.65
(1969); James, Kelly & Garmis, The School Budget Process in Large Cities, in GOVERNIN
EDUCATION 314-41 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1969).
59. All but thirteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and
Wyoming) expressly permit or require some form of consultation between local school
boards and teacher organizations. See Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. Reference File, 51: 501-21
(March, 1972). Usually the authority is statutory. See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. 14 § '1001
et seq. (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. 43 § 1101.101 et seq. (West Supp. 1972). In other
states authority is by judicial decision. See, e.g., Chicago Div. of I1l. Educ. Ass n v. lid.
of Educ., 76 I11. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); State Bd. of Regents v. United
Packing House Workers, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). In addition, collective bargaining
may be ongoing in some of the thirteen states listed above either unofficially or as a
result of local ordinance. For example, Dayton, Ohio passed city ordinances in April
1972 which permitted such negotiations. See Gov'T EsI,. REL. REI'. No. 452 (May 15,
1972), B-3.
60. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1972); 6 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327
(1971 Supp.); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342.440, 342.460 (1971). See note 61 infra. ,
61. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin. See Covr Err. REL. REP. Reference File, 51: 501-21 (1972). The recent Min-
nesota Public Employment Labor Relations statute is typical of this kind:
A public employer has an obligation to meet and negotiate in good faith with the
exclusive representative of the public employees in an appropriate unit regarding
grievance procedures and the terms and conditions of employment, but such obli-
gation does not compel the public employer or its representative to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.66(2) (West Supp. 1972). A few states distinguish the mandatory
duty to "negotiate in good faith" certain subjects from the duty to "meet and confer'
about others. See, e.g., 13 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (West Supp. 1972).
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tative organization from an affiliate of either the National Education
Association (NEA) or American Federation of Teachers (AFT),02 and
in most states the chosen union is the exclusive bargaining represen-
tative for all teachers in the district. 3 The subjects of bargaining in-
clude not only teacher salaries and benefits, but a wide range of other
matters that directly or indirectly affect teachers as well; 4 the fine line
between bargainable "terms and conditions of employment" and non-
bargainable "matters of educational policy" is very clouded and in-
creasingly litigated.G5 If the teachers and the board fail to agree on a
contract, various devices including mediation and arbitration are avail-
able to break the impasse, though compulsory provisions for binding
arbitration are rare.00 Finally, although teacher strikes are illegal in
62. See notes 72-74, 77 infra.
63. California is now the major exception to this general pattern among the states
which permit formal teacher bargaining. CAL. ANN. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1972)
provides for proportional representation on a "negotiating council," in districts where
teachers are represented by more than one organization. Both Minnesota and Oregon.
states which tried the proportional representation model, have recently amended their
statutes to provide for exclusive recognition. See MINN. STAT. ANN. q 179.67 (West Supp.
1972), repealing § 125.22; ORE. Rrv. STAT. § 342A60(5) (1971). In Wisconsin, exclusise
representation, though commonly practiced, was officially established by decision of the
state's supreme court. Board of School Directors of Milwaukee v. WERC, 42 Wis. 2d 637,
168 N.AV.2d 92 (1969). See also H. WELLINGrON & R. WiTr, Tue UNioxs AND Tim
CrrIsES 91-93 (1971).
64. See note 104 infra. Most statutes do not describe the subjects of bargaining be-
yond the phrase "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of emplo)ment." See,
e.g., MICH. Co. tt, LAws § 423.215 (West 1967). Interpretation of the phrase falls to the
respective state labor board, the courts, and often for want of legal challenge, simply
to the parties themselves on the basis of their respective bargaining power. Subjects
commonly found in collective agreements include, in addition to compensation scales,
the school calendar and length of the school day, duty-free periods for lunch or prep-
aration, attendance at off-hour school functions, secretarial duties (e.g., attendance
rolls), transfer and promotion procedures, job evaluation, special leave provisions, teacher
security, student discipline policy, class-size limitations, use of school facilities for union
meetings or posting of union news, dues check-off, access to personnel files, and may
range to personal comforts such as a teachers' lounge, cafeteria, or parking space.
Compare the contract of the Aurora, Colorado, Education Association, GoV'r E.sa. REL.
Rn'., No. 377 (Nov. 30, 1970) 145, with that of the UFT of New York City, Gov'T EMC.
REL. REP. Reference File, 81: 1581 (1972). See also NEA RESERct Bu. LrsN 106 (Dc.
1970), stating that 172 collective agreements, or approximately eighteen percent of all
agreements, provided for teacher review of curriculum. See generaily ADA CotMM. ox
STATE LABOR LAW-1969-70, as reported in Gov'T EMsp. REL. REt,. Reference File 61: 201,
202-03 (1972).
65. See notes 64 supra and 104 infra. See, e.g., Joint School Dist. No. 8, City of
Madison v. VERB, 37 Wis. 2d 483, 494-95, 155 N.W.2d 78, 83.84 (1967) (school calendar
is "negotiable"); Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17.
282 N.E.2d 109 (1972) (job related personal property damage reimbursement, partial
tuition repayments for approved graduate courses, retirement monetary amard, and the
submission to binding arbitration of disputes concerning continued qualification of a ten-
ured teacher, all "terms and conditions of employment" under Ta)lor Law). See also H.
'WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, TnE UNIONs AND THE CrES 137-42 (1971).
66. Nevada seems to be the only state with a statute that not only permits the
parties to agree to a binding fact-finding process, but also gives the governor authority,
at the request of either party, before submission to the fact-finder to order that his
recommendations be binding. See Gov'T E.iP. REL. REi,., No. 468 (Sept. 4, 1972) B-12
for the first results under this amendment and a discussion of problems raised by the
procedure. A few states expressly permit the parties to agree to a binding impasse
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almost all states,07 they have recently become fairly common. 8
If Rodriguez is affirmed, the attention of the teacher organizations
should shift to the state level. This shift will not necessarily be swift
or unqualified. Even if expenditures were equalized throughout the
state, teacher organizations in some districts might continue to con-
centrate their efforts locally, seeking a favorable allocation of dispersed
state funds between teacher compensation and other educational costs.
If, as we shall discuss later, wealthy districts succeed in shifting some of
their school costs to other public budgets,0 0 local bargaining may prove
attractive in such districts. Under power equalization, unions would
maintain local pressures on each district for higher tax rates, and
unions in districts relatively amenable to high rates may well prefer
this finance system to full state funding, where the union might con-
front a more frugal state legislature.
But the overwhelming trend should be toward action at the state
level. The allocation of a district's education budget between teacher
and non-teacher expenses is difficult to manipulate, and expenditure
cutbacks on other items would adversely affect teacher working condi-
tions.7 0 Shifts from school to non-school budgets will have to be
checked by the courts.71 Under full state funding, therefore, a local
union will probably gain more by working at the state level to increase
the district's total disbursement, than by fighting with local authorities
over the intra-district allocation of funds.
Under power equalization, the state will establish the tax rate-expen-
diture schedule, and determine the extent to which it should be ad-
justed for district cost differences or categorical needs, While limited
fiscal discretion will be left to districts, even powerful and mature
teacher organizations will find it difficult to influence this discretion
procedure though usually reserving final approval of "cost issues" to a legislative body.
See, e.g., HAWAIu REV. STAT. § 89-11 (Stpp. 1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (lVest
Stpp. 1972); ProvidenceTeachers Union v. School Comm. of City of Providence, 276 A.2d
762 (R.I. 1971). Cf. N.Y. CIv. SER . LAW § 209 (McKinney Sipp. 1972) (lefislative body
to resolve dispute if other stages of procedure fail to resolve dispute); sheel, The Taylor
Law: A Critical Examination of its Virtues and Defects, 20 StAcuse L. REV. 181 (1968).
67. Hawaii and Pennsylvania expressly grant teachers (and other public employees)
a limited right to strike. See HAWAII REV. STATr. § 89-12 (Stipp. 1971); P'A. ST~r. ANN. tit.
43, § 1101.1003 (1'urdon's Stipp. 1972).
68. The greatest number of teachers' strikes, at least 181, occurred in 1969-70. Comn-
pare GOV'T ENiI'. REL. REI'. No. 459 (uly 3, 1972), B3-21 (setting the figurc at I81), ithi
H. WELLINGTON & R. WVINTER, TimE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 216 (setting the figure at
230 on the basis of Bureau of Labor statistics). Teacher strikes declined significantly, to
89, in 1971-72, probably because of the combined effect of the wageprce freeze, bond
referenda defeats, and the increased supply of teachers. See GOV'T EI'.Trl REL. r. No.
459 (July 3, 1972), B-21.
69. See pp. 445-46 infra.
70. See p. 418 supra.
71. See pp. 445-46 infra.
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toward higher expenditures in "rich" districts which will face un-
attractive tax rate-expenditure trade-offs under power equalization.
Such unions will probably quickly concentrate their efforts at the state
level to replace power equalization with full state funding and to
achieve as generous district expenditure disparities as the courts will
allow.
Of course, while collective bargaining has been primarily a local
phenomenon, teacher organizations have not been inactive in the past
at the state level. The NEA, by far the largest teacher organization, -'
was in the business of lobbying at the state level long before it began
local collective bargaining.73 And the AFT, the Avis of teacher organi-
zations,74 while perhaps better known for its local efforts, has been in-
creasingly active at the state level in recent years and is currently pre-
paring major state lobbying efforts in New York and elsewhereTh These
organizations lobby for favorable collective bargaining legislation, and
favorable direct action on all terms and conditions of employment,
even those subject to local bargaining, once lobbying at the state level
proves more successful than local bargaining."0
In a post-Rodriguez future, union activity at the state level should
be transformed by two related developments: The various organiza-
72. As of May 31, 1971, the NEA had a national membership of 1,103,485 and was
working for unification with all of its state affiliates which would bring its total number
to 1,726,751. (Approximately seventy-five percent of all instructional staff.) NEA HAND-
BOOK, 1971-72, at 372, 376 (1972).
73. See note 18 supra. Along with its state affiliates, the NFA has elaborate mech-
anisms for focusing and enlisting support for educational legislation, rating legislators,
and publicizing their evaluations. See M. NMosgow, V. LOEWFNBERG & E. KoZIARA, COLLEC
TivE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EtPLO mr'T 137-38 (1970). The first state laws providing
for teacher collective bargaining (California, Connecticut, Oregon) were themselves largel)
the result of NEA pressures. E. SHILS & C. iurITriER, TEACHERS, tDMINISMRAT0%S, AND
CoLcrivE BARGAINING 27 (1968).
74. As of May 31, 1972, AFT membership totaled 261,506 according to their head-
quarters in Washington, D.C.
75. New York City's UFT is collecting $10 from each of its members to deal with
"-problems at the Albany level,'" since Albert Shanker has decided that '"what we
won can still be lost and that what we struggle to gain in our contract can be nullified
through the political process in City Hall, Albany and Washington, D.C." The United
Teacher, April 23, 1972 at 15.
76. For a general description of various kinds of lobbying tactics used by public em-
ployee organizations see M. MosKOw, J. LoEwENEROc, & E. KozzARA, ConErive BARG..NING
IN PUBLIC E.MPLOY.MtENT 266-69 (1970). During the 1960's teacher organizations often ap-
plied pressures and sanctions commonly associated with collective bargaining in situa-
tions that were more akin to "lobbying." For example, the statewide strike by Utah
teachers in 1964 occurred because the governor refused to accept recommendations
from a committee he had appointed under pressure from the NE .A state lobby. In the
months following, the teachers' interest groups succeeded in helping to elect a more
favorably inclined governor and in drawing an additional $'26A million from the state
legislature. See M. Mosowv, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 180 (1966). See also E. Slt.s & C.
WVHITrIER, TEACHERS, ADMINIsTRATos AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 47-91 (1968). See also
Cass, Politics and Education in the Sunshine State-the Florida Stoy, in TtE CoLLEcnE
DILEn.MiA: NEGoTrboNs IN EDUCATION 152 (P. Carlton & H. Goodwin eds. 1969).
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tions will cooperate much more closely with each other to present a
united front to the legislature, and the unions will press-probably
successfully-for some form of statewide collective bargaining.
For inter-union cooperation, the immediate aftermath of Rodriguez
will undoubtedly pose difficulties. Union locals from high- and low-
spending districts will have conflicting interests, and suburban and
urban interests will be divided over which types of expenditure dispari-
ties should be allowed. The conflict may split to some extent on NEA-
AFT lines, since the AFT often represents teachers in the state's larger
cities, while the NEA represents those in the suburban and rural
areas.7 7 Nevertheless, the obvious advantages of union cooperation
should overcome these conflicts. All organizations will agree that total
state revenues for education should be increased and that a united
front is necessary to overcome legislative opposition from urban and
suburban residents adversely affected by the tax consequences of full
state funding or power equalization.7 8 Once the unions realize that
post-Rodriguez reforms have drained local collective bargaining of
almost all of its fiscal importance, the impulse toward labor movement
retrenchment and unification should prove overwhelming.
In many states, the result may be formal merger of the state AFT
and NEA. To some extent, the likelihood of merger is dependent on
the relative membership of each organization, with merger becoming
more likely as they approach approximately equal strength. But even
where the AFT is a small minority, 9 both organizations will have
incentives to merge. Where the AFT realistically believes itself bound
to permanent minority status and perceives that local majority status
is unimportant given the demise of local bargaining, it may be at-
tracted to merger. The NEA, even where it has a statewide majority,
may welcome the opportunity to combine forces and cease destructive
rivalry. The short-run may well see bitter inter-union rivalry in some
77. While the AFT has only about 250,000 members compared to approximately 1.7
million affiliated with the NEA, AFT locals are powerful, possessing exclusive rep-
resentation rights in such major cities as Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Pitts.
burgh, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, and Kansas City. (Source: List of Locals-
AFT Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) The NEA has derived most of its large mem-
bership from its state associations, which can act independently of the national asso-
ciation and until recently have been much less organized for the purposes of collective
bargaining than the AFT. See M. MosKoW, J. LOEWENBERG & E. KOZIARA, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 135-41 (1970).
78. See pp. 418-22. Rural areas may also oppose revenue increases. Even though
they would be substantially advantaged on the expenditure side by an equal per pupil
distribution formula, their property tax rates (which are typically very low ones) would
increase very substantially to raise even the same total statewide revenue as is now
raised (that is, even without any revenue increase). See URBAN INSTITUTE, PUIILIC SCHOOL
FINANCE: PRESENT DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIvES 56-58, 130 (1972).
79. See notes 72, 74, 77 supra.
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states, but it is difficult to believe that the unions will fail in the long-
run to see that their common interests outweigh their differences."0
Moreover, the ideological differences which have traditionally sepa-
rated the NEA and AFT have become less important since the NEA
abandoned its no-strike policy in 1966.81 There have already been
mergers in some places, most notably in Los Angeles, New Orleans,
and New York State,8 2 where the parties hoped to establish a "joint lob-
bying effort in the State legislature [and to] fuse . . . political action
programs for the 1972 primary and general elections."83 As New York
City AFT President Shanker put it, "[T]eachers who had pinned their
hopes for progress on gains that were being made at the bargaining
table now see these gains being wiped out in the political arena."84
The unions -will also realize that their strike threat will be poten-
tially much more influential after merger and centralization.8 5 Strikes
will probably continue to be illegal in most states, but the prohibition
should prove no more effective than it is now.80 A statewide strike
would, of course, be an awesome weapon, and a centralized union
would still retain the option of calling selective local strikes, even
when the dispute concerned the entire state, to pressure strategic legis-
80. For a prediction of the effects of a possible NEA-AFT merger on teacher mili-
tancy-concluding that it would "simultaneously encourage some tendencies toward
greater teacher militancy and some toward less militancy"-sec Liebernan, Implications
of the Coming NEA-AFT Merger, in THE COLLECTIVE DiLastA: NEGOTIATIONS IN EDi-
CATION 44 (P. Carlton & H. Goodwin eds. 1969).
81. Besides the conflict in ideas over the strike issue, two other major ideological
differences have traditionally separated the NEA from the AFT. First, partly because
of its loose organization among local state affiliates and national headquarters and partly
because of its "professional" orientation, the NEA has alays included administrators
as well as teachers in its membership. With the increase in formal negotiations across
the country, however, and the retraction of the "no-strike" policy, it has already proved
impractical for administrators in most instances to straddle the fence diiding labor from
management. Second, the NEA has always disapproved the alliance between the AFT
and the AFL-CIO, and this issue remains an obstacle in current discussions about mer-
gers and merger possibilities. See GovT Emp. RE.. REP. No. 459 (July 3, 1972). B-18,
for the most recent NEA Convention's stand on this issue and see GoVT EmP. Rn.. REP.
No. 467 (August 28, 1972), B-10, for the AFT's response. See also Moskow & Doherty,
United States, in TEACHER UNIONS AND AssociATIoNs: A CoMIARATIE STUDY 295, 298-306
(A. Blum ed. 1969); Lieberman, Implications of the Corning N'EA-AFT Merger, in Tim
CoLLEcrIVE DILE-MMA: NEGOTIATIONS IN EDUCATION 44 (P. Carlton & H. Goodwin eds.
1969).
82. See GovT Em,. R.L. REP. No. 456 (June 12, 1972), B-14 (New York); Govr EMI'.
Rn.. R P. No. 453 (May 22, 1972), B-13 (New Orleans); Gov't Emt. RX.. Rn'. No. 451
(May 8, 1972), B-23 (Los Angeles); Gov'T E.i'. R.L. R '. No. 319 (Oct. 20, 1969), B-12
(Flint, Michigan).
83. The United Teacher, April 9, 1972, at 2, col. 1.
84. Shanker, Where We Stand-The Legislative Session: A Gang.Up Against Teachers,
N.Y. Times, June 6, 1971, § 4, at 11, col. 6.
85. Coordinating and securing participation of all locals in a statewide strike may
prove difficult at first, but the increased coordination brought by centralization will
probably overcome this problem, and even a partially effective statewide strike would
be a major disruption.
86. See notes 67 & 68 supra.
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lators or to maintain a strike fund through the contributions of non-
striking members.
The advantages of formal collective bargaining for the teachers are
also clear. First, bargaining provides a formal process for lobbying, in-
creasing both the visibility and legitimacy of teacher demands. Bargain-
ing forces public officials to take teacher organizations seriously, and,
perhaps more importantly, makes teachers more likely to support their
own organization.8 7 Provisions for exclusive representation have simi-
lar effects.A8 Requiring that the government "bargain in good faith"
forces public officials at least to discuss issues they would prefer to
ignore.8 9 Mediation gives the bargaining process, and teacher organiza-
tions, a legitimacy lacking in mere lobbying, as it implies that the gov-
ernment should compromise with teachers, while resistance to lobbying
is often viewed as virtuous. A mediator's recommendations help con-
dition public opinion and structure subsequent attempts to break the
impasse, whether through bargaining or an appeal to some different
governmental institution. Finally, the existence of a contract for a
87. See A. ROSENTHAL, PEDAGOGUES AND POWER 154-73 (1969), for a comparison of
teacher unions in New York, Boston, Chicago, and San Francisco which suggests a posi-
tive relationship between the degree of collective bargaining and both the teachers'
perception of their own strength as a group and their achievement of success over
specific issues.
Indeed, the rise of the UFT in New York City can stand as a paradigm of how
membership and power coalesced rapidly when specific bread-and-butter issues affect.
ing the daily life of the individual teacher in the classroom became sharply outlined
against a concrete demand for a collective bargaining structure. This was apparent dur-
ing the period 1960-1962 when union leadership was willing to strike. See S. COLE, Till:
UNIONZATION OF TEACHERS 19-21, 164-70 (1969).
88. Competition for exclusive representation rights between the NEA and the AFT
during the sixties was an important factor in shaping the policies and strategies of the
two organizations and resulted in membership gains for both, though with greater
percentage gains in the AFT. See Muir, The Tough New Teacher, in TriE COLLECrIVE
DILEMMA: NEGOTIATIONS IN EDUCATION 34, 43 (P. Carlton & H. Goodwin eds. 1969). Ex-
clusive representation obviously greatly reinforces this competition at the local level, and
it also seems more likely to result in gaining the interest and organizational support
from the national union. See R. BRAUN, TEACHERS AND POWER 87-124 (1972) for a dis-
approving description of AFT organizational practices. See GOv'T EMI'. REL. Rt'. No.
467 (August 28, 1972), B-16, at B-17 as an illustration of how the AFT leadership
views the importance of legislation granting exclusive representation for spurring mem-
bership. See note 98 infra.
89. Even though the statutes mandating good-faith bargaining often expressly state
that concessions on any matter are not thereby required, we know perfectly well that
there are many "concessions"-that is, that the collective agreement is generally "ne.
gotiated" not mandated by the school board. Further, school boards may justifiably
fear that a decision not to move on a particular issue and an ensuing unilateral Im-
plementation will risk an expensive and divisive challenge as a "refusal to bargain."
See generally Seitz, School Board Authority and the Right of Public School Teachers
to Negotiate-A Legal Analysis, 22 VAND. L. REV. 239 (1969).
90. New York's Taylor Law, for example, empowers the state Public Employment
Relations Board to detennine that an impasse exists in collective negotiations and to
appoint a mediator to assist the parties and a fact-finding board to make public recon.
mendations. If this stage fails, the board itself has power to make recommendations and
authorize voluntary arbitration and ultimately a legislative committee may be called
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fixed term-whatever its precise legal status0 -shelters teachers from
temporary fluctuations in public opinion.
This unification of teacher organizations at the state level and state-
wide collective bargaining should reduce political pressure for large
district expenditure disparities. The AFT and NEA, in competition
for statewide power, will probably attempt to organize teachers in cur-
rently non-union, low-spending districts and-given that Rodriguez
will increase the salary expectations of teachers in such districts-ie
gesture will probably prove successful. 2 Moreover, their increasing
sense of state organizational unity will inevitably lead teachers through-
out the state to view themselves more and more as similarly situated.
Such statewide unity is inconsistent with union pressure for district
expenditure disparities. Moreover, the demise of local bargaining will
itself remove one cause of teacher salary differentials, district differ-
ences in union power. 93 Finally, a strong state union might be able to
increase total state educational expenditures, thus diminishing pressure
for district disparities.
This is not to say that statewide collective bargaining would end all
such disparities. As long as local districts remain, teachers will identify
themselves somewhat with local interests, and non-teacher interests will
still press for some disparities. But the collective bargaining process
should mute district differences, and the collective agreement may it-
self prove useful in clothing those disparities which are granted in
upon to make a final decision. N.Y. Cti. S.RV . Lw. § 209 (,McKinney Supp. 1972).
While this section has not been too successful in preventing strikes and the mediation and
fact-finding mechanisms are sometimes bypassed, a 1969 survey disclosed that out of
approximately 400 requests for mediation and fact-finding only about fifty Iiero tin.
successful in bringing about a settlement. See Doering, Impasse Issues in Teacher Dis-
putes Submitted to Fact Finding In Aew York, 27 AnnrrTION J. 1 (1972). But cif. Khccl.
The Taylor Law: A Critical Examination of Its Virtues and Defects, 20 SiR. L. REv.
181, 185-89 (1968) reciting the failure of mediation machinery in "difficult" cases and
the increase of exacerbation between the parties as result.
91. See, e.g., the budgetary cutback protection discussed in note 104 infra. In some
instances, courts have found the existence of a written contract for a definite term
to be critical to disputes between school boards and teachers. See, e.g., Proiidence
Teachers Union v. School Comm. of City of Providence, 276 A.2d 762 (R.I. 1971). See also,
Norton Teachers Ass'n v. Town of Norton, 279 N.E.2d 659 (Mass. 1972) (contract held
enforceable and board required to pay teachers' salary increases out of a blanket
education appropriation large enough to cover the contract but not large enough to
cover both the teachers' contract and other parts of board's proposed budget); Board
of Education of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.YId 122, 331
N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109 (1972) (following recommendations of fact.finders, school board
signed agreement but brought suit questioning its own authority to bind itself to certain
provisions; court finds all provisions valid). But see Board of Educ. of Scotsdale v.
Scottsdale Educ. Ass'n, 498 P.2d 578 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (board of education held
without authority to enter into collective bargaining agreements and contract declared
void).
92. Cf. note 88 supra.
93. See pp. 451-53 infra.
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judicially acceptable garb. A statewide union will almost certainly press
for a statewide salary schedule. Just as union politics will prevent the
organization from offering a schedule which includes extreme district
salary differentials, those differentials which are maintained will be
justified in terms which will strike the entire membership as "fair":
e.g., that the "cost of living" varies between districts, or that certain
districts have particularly difficult working conditions. If accepted by
the state, such disparities should pass judicial scrutiny, as they will
appear, and will to some extent be based, on genuine district differ-
ences in the "costs of teacher services."0 Moreover, the courts may be
loathe to undo the result of presumably arduous and arms-length
bargaining, although it is not inconceivable that they would impose
on the union a "duty of fair representation," which might afford some
protection against clear discrimination for teachers in disfavored dis.
tricts.95 In general, though, the state may find the collective agreement
a useful vehicle for "validating" district disparities demanded by vari-
ous non-teacher interests.
B. The Shape of Collective Bargaining.
1. The Bargaining Representatives
The statewide bargaining agent for teachers could be based either on
exclusive or some form of multi-union representation. Multi-union
representation could be achieved through a statewide election, with
each union's membership on the negotiating team based on the pro-
94. See pp. 449-50 infra.
95. While the duty of fair representation originated in response to racial discrimi.
nation, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), it has been extended to
include economic discrimination as well. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330
(1953); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Although the duty of fair representation is
the product of the Court's interpretation of the Railway Labor Act and Labor-Man.
agement Relations Act, it derives from general common law fiduciary principles, 323
U.S. 192, 202, and the Court has indicated that it may have a constitutional basis, id.
at 198-99. The union is obligated "to serve the interests of all members without hos.
tility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith
and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
Assuming that the duty of fair representation were made applicable to statewide teacher
unions, local teachers disfavored by a state negotiated agreement would have to persuade
the courts that the salary differentials were motivated by "bad faith," not by genuine cost
differences or educational priority choices, and the measurement and proof problems
here would be comparable to those tinder Rodriguez-based constitutional attacks on
distribution formulas. See pp. 451-53. For discussions of the duty of fair represen-
tation, see H. WELLINGION, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 145-75 (1968); Summers,
Collective Power and Individual Rights in the Collective Agreement-A Comparison of
Swedish and American Law, 72 YALE L.J. 421, 434 (1963); Jacobs & Winter,
Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage,
81 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1971).
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portion of votes it receives, or through some federated system, with
existing locals designating representatives to a state team.
The form of representation is likely to depend largely on the degree
of NEA-AFT and inter-local rivalry. Exclusive representation will
probably be preferred by most non-teacher interests, because it is fa-
miliar and appears more stable and efficient. 0 Perhaps the AFT would
favor multi-union representation, since its membership is so much
smaller than the NEA's, although this would not be entirely consistent
with its traditional position.97 Multi-union representation will cer-
tainly appeal to local unions skeptical that the state organization will
represent their interests. We have argued, however, that inter-union
tensions will diminish in the long run. NEA-AFT mergers will likely
lead to exclusive representation; and exclusive representation may
encourage merger, or may, in the long run, virtually eliminate either
the state NEA or AFT.98 In either case, the long-run prospect is "one
big union" representing at the state level all teachers in the state.
The state will likely be represented by a legislative committee, an
agent of the governor, a state administrative agency (probably the state
education department), or some combination of the three.9 Even if the
legislature retains the legal authority to review and revise a negotiated
agreement, the choice of state bargaining representative is critical. The
negotiated agreement will structure subsequent legislative proceedings,
and the bargaining representative will itself affect the political situa-
tion and the likelihood of legislative approval.100
Healthy labor relations are best served if the negotiated agreement
carries some presumption of validity, since this avoids the strife which
96. See note 63 supra. See E. SHILS & C. WitrrnER, TrAcERms, AmsuNImnATOMS, AND
CoLLEcnvE BARGAINING 239-41 (1968); H. WELLINGTON & R. W N'-, TuE UNIONS AND
THE Crrms 91-93 (1971); M. MosKow, J. LOEWENBERo & E. KozURA, Co crcnvm BAMcAINING
IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 231-33 (1970).
97. See M. MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 130-31 (1966).
98. Exclusive representation would probably result in increased NEA-AFT organiza-
tional efforts. See note 88 supra. If, as a consequence, the state membership of each
approached equality, merger would probably follow. If the AFT remained a small
minority, it might eventually "go out of business" in the state. Either of these out-
comes will lead to "one big state union" and, consequently, either is consistent with
the predictions in the text.
99. In Hawaii, the only state that presently has state level bargaining with teachers,
the statutory negotiating team consists of two members from the elected State Board
of Education and at least three representatives selected by the governor's office. 2 HAWAU
Rxv. STAT. § 89-6(b) (Supp. 1971). During the first and only experience with bargaining
under this statute the governor's representatives were all from the staff of the Department
of Education, although the governor himself participated in the final settlement. See
Gov't Earp. R.L. REP. No. 441 (Feb. 28, 1972), B-14.
100. Pre-legislative negotiations with the governor's office, for example, rather ob-
viously will result in a different political configuration than if negotiations are con-
ducted with a legislative committee or state education board.
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accompanies defeated expectations and saves all parties considerable
time and energy. The state's bargaining representative should therefore
be technically competent and politically realistic. But other consid-
erations will also bear on the selection. The legislature may wish to
diffuse political responsibility and avoid becoming the focal point of
the process.' 0 ' Teacher organizations may prefer, as public employee
unions now sometimes do, a process in which they can pit one political
actor against another. 0 To specify more precisely which institution
should represent the state in bargaining, we would have to know the
subjects of bargaining and the nature and extent of legislative review
of negotiated agreements. On both issues we can only speculate.
2. The Subjects of Bargaining
To the extent that "non-salary" items become subjects of state bar-
gaining, the centralization of finance must lead to some centralization
of general educational policy. At first, most formal "bargaining" may
be local with state union activity focusing on total revenue decisions
and distribution formulas. Even at this point, however, the state
teacher organizations may press for a relatively formal process to en-
able them to present and discuss, in connection with every education
appropriations bill, data on revenue projections, cost differences, com-
peting wage scales, and the like. And as statewide bargaining on salaries
develops, there may well be increasing pressure for discussing other
items now bargained locally and some that are not now subjects of
bargaining at all.
Several issues that teachers, with increasing frequency, bargain about
locally are tied to revenue considerations, and these issues should fol-
low other revenue decisions to the state level. While fringe benefits are
an obvious case, such matters as teaching loads, class size, and the
school calendar also have clear revenue implications. Local bargaining
on these matters will therefore prove relatively ineffective after the
basic revenue decision is shifted to the state.' 0 3 Curricular and program
choices, though often also involving "money" issues, have not tradi-
tionally played a major role in local bargaining, but teacher organiza-
101. In Illinois, for example, the legislature's desire to eliminate education as a
source of political conflict led to the establishment of a state commission which was
expected to keep proposals from the legislature until dissent had been silenced or
neutralized. See L. IANNACCONE, POLITICS IN EDUCATION (1967).
102. Cf. MI. LIEBERMAN & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEAChiERs 266-67
(1966).
103. See pp. 426-27 supra.
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tions are beginning to press for their inclusion.104 Such matters seem
more likely to be open to negotiation at the state level after equaliza-
tion than they are presently. As noted above, "progrlam" grants are one
solution to the problem of high-spending districts, a solution which
drags curriculum indirectly into the revenue debate and thus the col-
lective bargaining process.
As local bargaining becomes less significant, and the state bargaining
representative becomes a major spokesman for the "public interest"
in matters of education, the lines between subjects of local bargaining,
matters of state negotiation, and issues outside the scope of bargaining
will probably fade. Again, change may not be dramatic and the process
will vary from state to state, but teacher organizations will typically
press for state bargaining on subjects on which they believe state au-
thorities will be more pliant than local boards. It is difficult to predict
what these subjects will be, but they may include teacher work regu-
lations and evaluation procedures, some questions of student discipline,
some curricular and program issues, and possibly some issues of school
administration (e.g., the selection and authority of principals).
Local school boards typically resist teacher demands on such issues not
because an aroused citizenry demands resistance but rather out of some
sense of institutional role, sometimes, probably, under the effective
supervision of the local superintendent of schools and his staff t 15 and
it is not at all clear that state authorities will share these internalized
norms. Local boards may resist shifting these issues to state bargaining,
104. For a list of subjects often found in collective agreement, see notes 64 & 65
supra. The continuing battle between the union and the board of education (recently
involving the decentralized boards as well) over the More Effective Schools program
(a compensatory program) is perhaps the sharpest illustration of direct union incursion
into policy-making. See A. ROSENTHAL, PEDAGOGUES AND POWER 168-71 (1969); H. WELU1tING-
TON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND TIlE CITIES 139-41 (1971). More limited excursions
into matters such as mandatory class-size maximums and school disciplinary procedures
are more widespread and commonly appear in collective agreements across the country.
See, e.g., the 1972 statewide agreement for Hawaii, Gov'r E.it. RuL Rst,. No. 456
(June 12, 1972), X-1 to X-10. Recent teachers' strikes in Pittsburgh (fan. 1971) and Yonkers,
N.Y. (Jan. 1972) dearly keyed on the class-size issue. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971. at 18,
col. 5; N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1971, at 47, col. 6. Budgetary pressures often make class.size
and disciplinary provisions important in ways that were not apparent at the time of
the board's concession. The New York City class-size provision, for example, was ke)td
to student registration, not actual attendance, and even though high student absenteeism
would have permitted economies in distributing teachers for students in actual at-
tendance, budgetary cuts, therefore, had to be implemented by cutting back on equip.
ment and more vulnerable personnel. See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1972, at 11, col. 1. Cf.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, at 51, col. 4.
105. Cf. Kerr, The School Board as an Agency of Legitimation, and Rosenthal,
Pedagogues and Power, in GOVERNING EDucATioN 137, 291 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1969).
R. OwENs, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN ScHooLs 89-117 (1970); C. Bidwell, The School
as a Formal Organization, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIoNs 972, 1009-12 (J. Marsh ed.
1965).
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but they are likely to be considerably weaker politically than the
teacher organizations.' 0 6 Once an issue is included in state bargaining,
organized teachers will wield substantial power on all but highly visi-
ble and controversial issues, not only because the state bargaining rep-
resentative may lack the internalized norms of local boards, but also
because the state may be quick to make "hidden" non-fiscal concessions
in order to satisfy public opinion on more controversial revenue mat-
ters.10
7
3. The Role of the Legislature in Bargaining and Impasse Resolution
The state legislature might delegate complete authority to the state
bargaining representative to enter into binding agreements, an ap-
proach which would require state constitutional amendments to grant
the representative taxing and spending powers. At the other extreme,
the legislature might regard "bargaining" as merely a preliminary stage
of the legislative process, to be followed by a full legislative review of
every detail of the "negotiated" agreement. Quite probably the legis-
lature will choose neither of these extremes.
The first would require a fiscally independent state board of edu-
cation, a major and unlikely innovation. While fiscally independent
boards are common locally, this tradition does not exist at the state
level. The sheer magnitude of the revenue commitment'0 8 and the fact
that distribution formulas will be important to political subdivisions
with lobbying leverage make wholesale delegation of such legislative
authority extremely implausible.
However, detailed legislative review of negotiated agreements is also
unlikely. Much of the content of a collective agreement is likely to be
regarded as appropriate for "administrative" rather than "legislative"
resolution, and the legislature will wish to avoid involvement in the
details of contract negotiation. Even teacher salary schedules, aside
from the revenue commitment they require, seem unlikely subjects
for annual or biennial legislation, and regular review of contract mat-
ters more unrelated to revenue is even more unlikely. Even with re-
gard to matters delegated for bargaining, though, the legislature will
remain a relevant influence.' 0 9
106. The teacher organization has a large and directly affected constituency-the
teachers. The school board, by comparison, has no clear constituency unless local public
sentiment coalesces behind the board on a particular controversial issue. See L.
IANNOCCONE, POLITICS IN EDUCATION 29-36 (1967); Kerr, The School Board as an Agency
of Legitimation, in GOVERNING EDUCATION 137, 143-47 (A. Rosenthal ed. 1969).
107. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 21-24 (1971).
108. See note 45 supra.
109. Legislation will establish the scope of bargaining, and while the subjects are
likely to be described in very general language, leaving considerable room for both
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For the same reasons that legislatures will not relinquish their re-
view over revenue matters, they seem unlikely to establish binding
arbitration in the event of a negotiating impasse. While the contract
negotiations will structure the legislature's consideration of the im-
passe, the legislature itself will probably mediate the dispute. On non-
revenue matters, however, legislatures may permit compulsory arbi-
tration, perceiving these matters as "administrative" rather than "legis-
lative." Even if compulsory arbitration is not decreed, the legislature
may be inclined to permit the mediation of non-revenue issues by a
non-legislative public or private organization.
G. The Potential Consequences of Centralized Bargaining
The danger of increasing the centralization of educational policy is
not centralized indoctrination, but rather centralized rigidification. The
point is not that our current system of school governance is adequately
innovative or responsive, for it surely is not, but rather that centralized
bargaining could worsen an already bad situation. The very ease with
which the process can encompass new bargaining subjects recommends
some degree of scrutiny. We may otherwise not recognize it for what
it is, since the rigidity will come through "contract," not statute or
regulation.
The increase in teacher union strength which may accompany cen-
tralized bargaining exacerbates the problem and also poses a fiscal
threat. Public employee collective bargaining in general has been criti-
cized by Professors Wellington and Winter as a distortion of the politi-
cal process, on the ground that the union's strike capability combined
with the relative inelasticity of demand for many public goods and the
greater accessibility of the government to public pressure leaves com-
peting interest groups "at a permanent and substantial disadvan-
tage."' u 0 This argument must be qualified somewhat when applied
to fiscally independent school districts, where voters have demonstrated
by rejecting budget increases that union power can be checked."' Cen-
collective negotiation and judicial interpretation, see note 64 supra, there will probably
be pressure on legislatures to deal with some subjects statutorily, and thus remove
them from bargaining.
110. H. WELLiNGToN & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND TILE Crrs 29-32 (1971). Cf.
Mf. MOSKOW, TrAcHEas AND UNIONS 86 (1966).
111. In the last few years, voters have with increasing frequency defeated proposed
local school budgets, referenda for property tax increases for schools and school bond
proposals. Hundreds of newspaper articles throughout the nation have reported the
details of local defeats. A mid-1970 New York Times article reported that a "mounting
series of defeats for school financial measures across the country in recent months
has posed one of the most serious crises many educators can remember .... ." N.Y.
Times, May 24, 1970, at 11, col. 5. In 1971, fifty-si:x percent of bond proposals for ele-
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tralization of bargaining may, however, tip the balance even more to-
ward the union.
The increase in teacher organization membership that will probably
result from heightened organizational activity and the possibility of
"one big union" (either through merger or exclusive representation)
suggest state unions which in sheer size and disruption potential would
be very powerful indeed. Moreover, full state funding will almost cer-
tainly eliminate or attenuate the check of the direct voter veto over fis-
cal matters. Any significant increase in the number of bargainable
issues through their elevation to the state level will tend to increase
union power at the same time as it decreases local control, particularly
if, as seems likely, legislative review of these matters is minimal. Finally,
to the extent that state authorities lack the internalized norms which
have tended to stiffen the resistance of local boards to teacher demands,
there may be an increased tendency to regard teacher organizations as
presumptively correct on educational questions.
This picture of runaway union power may be overdrawn: The tra-
dition of local control, which teachers share, will exert some counter-
pressure, and teacher organizations clearly have no great love of school
bureaucracy. Local teacher organizations may resent the complete loss
of power entailed in shifting all bargaining to the state. State unions,
particularly at first, may be too unwieldly to coordinate and sustain
effective strikes, and may, in any event, be more fearful of incurring
the wrath of the legislature than of local authorities. Other interest
groups may arise to counter union power, though only a very few are
likely to have an interest as great as the teachers.1 2 Lastly, the present
over-supply of teachers should, if it continues, exert some downward
pressure on salaries, at least for beginning and non-tenured staff., l
mentary and secondary education were defeated, more than twice the rate of defeat
in 1960. SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION MUNICIPAL STATISTICAL BULLETIN, Table 4
(1971); INVESTMENT BANKERS ASSOCIArION MUNICIPAL STATISTICAL BULLETIN, Table 10 (1960).
See note 68 supra.
112. The increased costs of state as compared with local activity may well dampen
the formation of effective counter-union groups, although general groups (the NAACP,
United Taxpayers, etc.) may act as counterweights. Groups representing local school ad.
ministrators and maintenance and custodial workers are the only ones that will have
direct monetary stakes approaching (though far less in dollar amount) the teacher
unions.
113. According to NEA estimates, teacher supply as of the fall of 1971 exceeded
teacher demand (nationally) by between some 25,000 to 57,000 teachers at the ele-
mentary level, and 39,000 to 47,000 at the secondary level. NEA, TEAciLiR SUIPLY AND
DEMAND IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 1971, at 40 (1972). This excess supply, should it continue, will
presumably tend to hold down beginning teachers' salaries, since these salaries are
not typically of as great concern to unions lden with senior teachers. Its effect on
salary levels for tenured teachers is more problematic, however, since replacing striking
teachers has not by and large proven educationally or politically feasible. Cf. note 68
supra.
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III. Doctrinal Accommodations: Inter-district Differences in
the Cost of Education
The evolution of statewide collective bargaining should thus help
accommodate and at the same time moderate political pressures for
inter-district expenditure disparities. The disparities will not necessar-
ily be de minimis, however, nor unrelated to district property val-
ues. Would Rodriguez permit such an outcome?
The state will undoubtedly argue that having eliminated the de-
pendence of expenditures on district tax bases, there is no longer
any "wealth classification" under Rodriguez. The claim is at least color-
able: Existing finance systems do make expenditures a "function of"
wealth in a particularly direct fashion.11 4 But to the extent that district
expenditures correlate with district wealth under post-Rodriguez sys-
tems, the disparities will obviously not be a direct result of variations
among district tax bases. Rather, they may result from a finding (by
the legislature or through collective bargaining) that the "costs" of
educational goods and services are higher in districts that are also
relatively wealthy or from a decision to provide special funds for "ex-
perimental" programs in specific districts or for children with particu-
lar needs or talents who live primarily in "rich" cities and suburbs.
Whether a significant district wealth-expenditure correlation would
amount to a "wealth classification" presents an issue in the "de facto-de
jure" quagmire,115 a complex set of problems we shall not discuss in
any systematic way." 6 Specifying and measuring the kind of correla-
tions required will be difficult, and for these reasons, if no other, the
114. A district's wealth base affects its expenditures just as an individual's wealth
affects his purchases of goods and services. See note 115, 116 & 117 inra.
115. See notes 114 supra & 116 & 117 infra. Rodriguez says nothing pertinent on this
question. Serrano contains a longer, confusing and unhelpful discussion of the de facto-
de jure issue. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601-04, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252-55, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601, 612-15 (1971).
116. See notes 6 supra & 117 infra. Serrano and Rodriguez use the term "wealth"
discrimination to describe a system which makes expenditures dependent not on ab-
solute district wealth (e.g., where a district with less than X dollars in assessed %alue
is absolutely prohibited by the state from spending more than Y amount for educa-
tion) but on rather a district's "ability to pay." See Michelman, On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HAv. L. RasV. 7, 49-50 (1969); Shanks.
Book Review, 84 HRv. L. REv. 256,261 (1970). In virtually every case in which the
Supreme Court has used wealth discrimination language, the constitutional prohibition
was on the state making or permitting the distribution of "fundamental goods" to
depend on ability to pay, insofar as those too poor to pay were thereby denied access
to the good. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963). But see Harper
v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (voting cannot be condi-
tioned on the payment of any tax or fee, regardless of ability to pay). See also Askew
v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), vacating per curian, Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp.
944 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (involving state imposed tax limit on school district spending.
which is arguably more of a wealth thani ability to pay classification, since poor dis-
tricts are legally prohibited from spending as much as rich ones).
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courts may refuse to find a wealth classification on the basis of corre-
lations (impact) alone." 7
A more likely challenge to continued district wealth-related dispari-
ties would be that the state had only "nominally" dismantled or was
"perpetuating" an unconstitutional system, and that rich districts were
still "buying" better education in the "legislative market." Such a
claim would involve the little-understood and related theories of un-
constitutional "taint," "motivation," and of "enlarged judicial re-
medial power."" 81 If cost differentials were calculated on the basis of
expenditure patterns established under the former unconstitutional
system, the argument would be that they are "tainted,"' 10 or, more
generally, that tainted cost-differentials combined with a significant
wealth-expenditure correlation proves the disparities were "discrimi-
natorily motivated."' 20 Or perhaps the argument will be framed in
terms of the remedial power of the court, as in many Southern school
desegregation cases where a local board's action is assessed for its effi-
cacy in dismantling a formerly dual system, rather than as a fresh con-
stitutional issue.
12
If the court refuses to listen to both impact and "perpetuation" chal-
lenges to new finance systems, and confines Rodriguez to expenditure
117. The question is whether a law which has some kind of a "disproportionate
wealth impact" is for this reason alone a suspect classification requiring a "compelling
state interest" for justification. The answer to this question turns, presumably, on
whether the state ought to be constitutionally obligated to go out of its way to protect
groups disadvantaged by this impact. Professor Ely has argued that laws having a
disproportionate racial impact ought not, for this reason alone, call for a state jus-
tification, since a requirement that the government go out of its way to consider race
might ultimately be "turned to improper ends" and dilute the courts' moral authority.
Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1258-59 (1970). He reads the "wealth discrimination" decisions, correctly in my
view, as requiring the state to go out of its way to provide fundamental goods to
those too poor to pay for them and, on this basis, concludes that by virtue of the
very logic of the decisions the unconstitutionality is in the impact alone (i.e., lack
of access to the good). Id. at 1255. As the n6tion of "wealth discrimination" Is ex-
panded beyond its particular meaning in these cases, however, it becomes very dif-
ficult to appraise the "impact alone" question without some clearer understanding
than has yet been provided of the normative basis for the broadened wealth dis-
crimination doctrine. We cannot know what impacts are "discriminatory" unless we
know what evil we are trying to prevent. See notes 6 & 116 supra.
118. See generally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 180-32
(1970); Freund, Constitutional Dilemmas, 45 B.U.L. REv. 13, 20 (1965); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1289-91 (1970).
119. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545, 550-51 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
120. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347-48 (1960). Cf. Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968). See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
in the Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
121. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 18-21,
31-32 (1971); North Carolina State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971);
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 236 (1969).
This approach rather clearly implies a motivational analysis. See note 118 supra.
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disparities that are a direct result of variations in tax bases, post-Rod-
riguez systems based on statewide financing would be substantially im-
mune from constitutional attack. Disparities which could in any way
be explained on the basis of cost differences or special program aid
should have little trouble surviving the traditional Equal Protection
rational relationship test.12 2 In this case, the forces of political accom-
modation discussed above will virtually determine the impact of the
decision on per pupil expenditures.
It seems unlikely, however, that the courts will ignore all such claims,
and we shall therefore assume that the courts will be willing to deal
with a legislative or bargained continuation of district wealth-correlated
expenditure disparities. It does not follow, however, that there can be
no political accommodation resulting in wealth-correlated district dis-
parities. First, some disparities may be justified by a "compelling state
interest"-a subject we shall discuss only briefly. Second, some dispari-
ties will almost certainly be permitted and may even be constitutionally
required under Rodriguez. These are disparities based on genuine
inter-district differences in the "cost" of education.
A. Education: Tasks v. Achievements
One cannot sensibly analyze the costs of education without defining
education. 123 We commonly use the word to include both tasks and
achievements. Teachers use resources such as their skills, books, and
equipment to perform tasks with students which result in a variety of
student achievements. However, whether a teacher is "educating" a
student depends ultimately on whether the student is achieving.
-12 4
Thus we cannot sensibly speak of "better" or "worse" education with-
out at least implicitly raising the achievement question.
There are, however, several obstacles to constructing a constitutional
theory which requires "equality" in student achievement. The first is
122. The word "should" is chosen advisedly, since the core unintelligibility of the
rational relationship test makes it difficult to know what classifications will survive it.
See note 146 infra. Professor Gunther has recently suggcsted that a new version of the
rational relationship test may be emerging, a version under which the Court will not
be satisfied by "minimal rationality" but will inquire whether the "legislative means ...
substantially further legislative ends." Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARY. L. Rrv. 1, 20-24
(1972). Even under this test, most reasonably probable cost-differential or special pro-
gram aid formulas will probably survive attack, for the same reasons as, according to
the argument at pp. 456-57, they will probably survive a "de facto wealth classification"
attack.
123. For an excellent, though ultimately unsatisfying, attempt by a linguistic phil-
osopher to unravel the philosophy of education, see R. PETERns, ETmics A.ND EDurcA-ro.
(1966).
124. Id. at 4-5.
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that genetically and environmentally determined student abilities are
themselves among the resources that generate achievement. Since the
state is not directly responsible for such disparities, state action can
never be more than partially responsible for variations in student
achievements.
Second, given the wide variations in students' abilities, an achieve-
ment equality goal would require massive compensatory education for
children from low socio-economic backgrounds. While this may be an
appealing policy, courts are unlikely to require it, and it is highly
problematic whether even the most ambitious programs would produce
achievement equality.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, education consists of a multi-
tude of distinct, often substitutable but rarely comparable, achieve-
ments.12 Students learn to read, do math, paint, love their country,
work independently, get along with others, and earn money in an in-
finity of ways. Given that different students attain different types of
achievements at different levels and at different times, a court, even
if it wanted to equalize "achievement," would need some objective
means of comparing one type, level, and time of achievement with
another. No such means exist. This is presumably what prompted the
district court in Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 26 to reject as nonjusticiable the
claim that educational resources must be distributed in accordance
with students' "needs.' -2 T
The Rodriguez theory "solves" all three of these problems. Educa-
tion is defined as the tasks performed with students rather than the
resulting achievements. The state established the decentralized finance
system leading to the distribution of task-resources in what the court
found a "wealth discriminatory" fashion. Equalizing task-resources is
much more "feasible" than equalizing student achievements. The com-
parability problem, which would be just as troublesome in a direct
attempt to "equalize" a multitude of often interchangeable and rarely
comparable tasks, is avoided by a simple empirical assumption: Two
tasks are assumed "equal" if the resources necessary for their accom-
plishment cost the same.
Though concerned with the equalization of educational tasks, both
125. See note 136 infra.
126. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 391
U.S. 322 (1969). See also Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), ajf'd
men., 397 U.S. 44 (1970). The Rodriguez court considered itself not bound by the
Supreme Court summary affirmances in Mclnnis and Burruss because it regarded the
claims therein as non-justiciable. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,
3 37 F. Sup
p . 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971).127. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36.
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Serrano and Rodriguez hold education a fundamental interest because
of several of its most general achievement goals: economic, social, and
life success; professional training; public responsibility and good citi-
zenship; political and community participation; awareness of cultural
values; "normal" adjustment to the environment. 12s On the question
of the relationship between expenditures and achievement, Serrano,
which was decided on demurrer, ruled that some unspecified proof
would be required at trial, though the California court seems to sug-
gest a presumption in favor of the cost-quality relationship. 29 Rod-
riguez is completely silent on the issue, but its invocation of achieve-
ment goals to establish the fundamental interest indicates that the
court assumed some relationship between expenditures and achieve-
ment. 30
Much of the commentary on Serrano and Rodriguez concerns this
"expenditure-quality" or "cost-quality" question. 13 The pre-Serrano
Coleman Report finding that variations in per pupil expenditures had
virtually no effect on student performance on a verbal ability test is the
principal basis for much of the debate.' 32 The Report and similar stud-
ies' 33 certainly corroborate the fact that expenditure equalization is a
far cry from achievement equalization, yet Serrano and Rodriguez do
not pretend to speak to achievement equalization. If the Report proved
expenditures have no effect on any educational achievements, the cases
would then be equalizing a variable unrelated to the fundamental inter-
est. The Report does not, however, prove this. Putting aside the fact
128. See note 6 supra for a general discussion of suspect classifications and funda-
mental interests. I have combined the overlapping, though differently articulated, %er-
sions from both decisions. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605, 487 P.2d 1241,
1255-56, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 615-16 (1971); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District, 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (the latter relying on a quotation
from Brown v. Board of Education). No prior Supreme Court decision, of course, had
held education to be a fundamental interest. Whether education is "fundamental" is
also currently before the Supreme Court in Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dept., 449
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972) (challenging free elementary
school book dependence on taxpayer approval of tax assessment). Cf. notes 136 & 139 infra.
129. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 1252-53 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) n.16.
130. 337 F. Supp. 280, 283 (1971). See note 8 supra.
131. See note 9 supra.
132. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTi, EUrATION AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTuNrrY 314-15 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Co..%t.
REPORT].
133. See Smith, Equality of Educational Opportunity: The Basic Findings Recon-
sidered, and Jencks, The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom, in O. EQuArTY
OF EDUCATONAL OPPoRTuNrrY (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972). See also Picarriello,
Report for Fiscal Year 1967, in How EFFEcTIVE is SCHOOLING? (Averch ed. 1971); NATIONAL
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN, FOUIV l ANNUAL
REPORT (1966) (both concluding that funds from Title I of the ESEA do not improve
learning).
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that its methodology has been vigorously criticized'0 4 and that other
studies have reached different conclusions' 35-this is hardly a battle to
be resolved in the courts-Serrano and Rodriguez find education a fun-
damental interest because it involves a wide variety of very abstract
social goals. 136 The Coleman Report does not deal with such goals, and
it is not clear that such complex relationships are in any sense reliably
measurable.137 The courts appear content to find on the basis of "com-
mon wisdom" or intuition that children will probably be "better edu-
cated" the more resources are devoted to their educationY'88
If such thinking is not what underlies Rodriguez (and the opinion
is concededly unclear), the decision apparently becomes inexplicable
except on tax "equalization" grounds,' 39 since then the only injury
134. These criticisms have generally focused on the Report's allegedly inadequate
model of school operations, inadequate sample, improper survey questions, invalid treat-
ment of the data, and inappropriate statistical techniques. See 1 CAL. SENATE SELECr
CoMITrTEE ON SCHOOL DisRiC FINANCE, FINAL REPORT 29-32 (1972); J. GUTHRInE, G.
KLEINDORFER, H. LEVIN & R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY 60-62 (1971).
135. For sutmmaries of many other studies, see J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H, LEVIN
& R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY 65-90 (1971); I CAL. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
SCHOOL DisTRicr FINANCE, FINAL REPORT 32-33 (1972).
136. As any intelligent book on the history, sociology or philosophy of education-
or ideological writings-makes clear, the point of a formal educational system, rather
obviously, is to develop the kinds of people that a society wishes its citizens to be. Perhaps
the best "direct" evidence of the multiplicity of "goals" of American education Is
an elementary school report card, which will invariably contain evaluations on many
dimensions other than the cognitive skill categories.
137. We should note, however, that Coleman selected verbal ability because it appeared
more responsive to school characteristics than other contemplated measures, e.g., "non.
verbal ability," "reading comprehension" and "mathematical achievement." COLEIMAN
REPORT, supra note 132, at 292-95. Nonetheless, such measures tell us something about
school effects on broader attitudinal, behavioral, or particular vocational achievements
only to the extent that they are related to and therefore surrogate for such achievements.
But we have far too little understanding of the relationships among cognitive variables,
much less between cognitive and emotional variables, to be confident of any such re-
lationship. Cf. Dyer, School Factors and Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 HARv. ED.
REV. 23 (1968) (arguing that verbal ability is particularly ill-suited as an index of
achievement among black students).
138. Given Rodriguez' silence on the issue, the court's evidentiary use of "common
wisdom" or intuition is unclear. Although the record is sparse on the cost-quality ques-
tion, both sides apparently produced some evidence, and Rodriguez cannot, therefore,
be explained on the basis that the court created a presumption shifting the burden
of coming forward with evidence to the defendant. Nor does it seem possible that the
court created an "irrebuttable presumption" that dollars equal quality, as this would
amount to a rule of law that expenditures are fundamental regardless of their effect
on achievement. See note 140 infra. Professor Goldstein has suggested that perhaps
a showing of expenditure inequality shifts the burden of proof to the state to prove
that such expenditures are irrelevant. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School
Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
504, 521-22 (1972). See also Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 854-55 (D.D.C. 1971).
This does not, of course, explain why the burden of persuasion should be shifted,
and (since there was no jury trial) the only evident reason for the shift in this case
would be that the court was predisposed to believe that costs, more probably than not,
do relate to quality-a predisposition presumably based on "intuition" or "common
knowledge" akin to judicial notice. See generally IV J. WIIIORE, ON EVIDENCE §§ 2490'93
(1940).
139. It might be possible to avoid this characterization by constructing a different
theory of the constitutional harm in Rodriguez. The theory of harm often proposed
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caused by the current finance system would be to taxpayers.1 40 This
tax equality theory would seemingly call for the invalidation of the
decentralized finance of all public services, not merely of education,
a holding which the courts will very likely wish to avoid.14'
Moreover, if the courts viewed the relationship between expendi-
tures and achievement as irrelevant, they would have no satisfactory
way of determining which tasks count as "education." The choice of
per pupil expenditures as the "equalizing variable" eliminates the
problem of quantitatively comparing incomparable educational
achievements or tasks,142 but it does not relieve the courts of deciding
which achievements (and thus which tasks) should count as education.
The Rodriguez court, perhaps unintentionally, obfuscated this issue,
by effectively holding that all the tasks performed in school and there-
fore all the resources which comprise them constitute "education."
Presumably, this implicit holding precludes a legislature from defining
to explain Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)-that racial separation is
itself the harm-does not seem honestly transplantable, given the clear differences be-
tween the use of race and local tax bases as classifications. But cf. Michelman, On
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amnendinent, 83 HAv. L. REV. 7, 20-21.
27-29 (1969). For a discussion of the Brown issue, see Kaplan, Segregation Litigation
and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 NoRantwzsrznx L. Rxv. 157,
168-75 (1963). A more fruitful approach might be to press deeper into the fundamental
interest-to argue, essentially, that education, as it has developed historically, has be-
come charged with symbolic and ideoloical significance and that this symbolism and
ideology can themselves be explicated in principled argument to imply certain pro.
hibitions and obligations applicable to the state, irrespective of achievement-impact.
While I do not regard an argument in this form as impossible-indeed, in gross ethical
terms it rings quite true-I shall not attempt it here.
140. Both the popular press and scholarly literature, to some extent, have interpreted
Serrano as requiring some kind of tax equality. Given the ambiguity of Serrano this is
understandable. See 5 Cal. 3d 594, 599-600, 611, 618, 487 P.2d 1241, 1225 & 1252, 1260,
1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611-12, 620, 625 (1971). Yet it seems clear to me that Serrano
and Rodriguez no more imply tax equality (if per pupil expenditures have been
equalized) than Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), or Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), imply that after the state provides free appate counsel
for indigent criminal defendants or eliminates the poll tax, equal protection further
constricts the finance system used to pay for counsel or election costs. In all of these
cases any taxpayer injury does not affect the respective fundamental interests. Cf. note
151 infra. For an alternative constitutional theory that would outlaw all except power-
equalized decentralized finance for all public services, see Schoettle, The Equal Pro-
tection Clause in Public Education, 71 CoLU. M. L. Rxv. 1355, 1402-12 (1971). For a brief
rebuttal, see Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis
of Serrano v. Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. Rv. 504, 542 n.l19 (1972). See also
notes 139 supra and 141 infra.
141. See notes 139 and 140 supra. The courts have held that the provision of munici-
pal services in a racially discriminatory manner (using an impact test) violates the
equal protection clause. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).
This has not been extended to wealth classifications, however. Indeed, in Hadnott v.
City of Prattville, 309 F. Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970), the court held that special assessment
financing of streets justified a disproportionate racial impact (or disproved an, claimed
racial motivation) precisely because the street differences were "due to the difference
in the respective landowners' ability and willingness to pay for the property improve-
ments." Id. at 970 (emphasis added).
142. See pp. 442-43 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
some tasks as "education" and others as "frills," severing only the
former from local wealth variations. 143 But this approach does not
"solve" the problem of defining education.
If education covers only the resources purchased by schools, wealthy
districts will simply assign as many of their "schooling" costs as possible
to non-school budgets, parcelling them out, for instance, to park and
library departments, music and art workshops, and so forth. Under
power equalization, this problem would be particularly acute, since
rich districts would have an incentive not only to maintain luxurious
programs, but also to avoid redistribution of wealth away from the
district. Poor districts would have equally strong incentives to call
everything imaginable education in order to receive state subsidies.
To avoid wholesale evasion of Serrano and Rodriguez, the courts
will therefore have to maintain a surveillance of the local budgetary
process, encountering along the way many embarrassingly close ques-
tions: Is a swimming pool education? An auditorium? A park or library
(adjacent to the school or further away)? A community-run class in
music appreciation? A mental health clinic for children? These judg-
ments are hardly easy, yet Rodriguez makes them inevitable, and judi-
cial line-drawing is, after all, a concomitant of constitutional litigation.
B. Different Costs for Different Amounts of Useless Resources
Rodriguez must be read, then, as defining task resources as educa-
tional only if they affect, or are somehow related to, achievement. This
raises the possibility that the state might justify wealth-correlated devia-
tions from equality by arguing that favored districts were indeed being
empowered to buy more particular school resources, but that these
resources were having no effect on educational achievement. This claim
would also rely on the Coleman Report (contested) findings that varia-
tions in particular school resources (including pupil-teacher ratios and
teacher experience and education) have virtually no effect on student
performance on a verbal ability test.144
Given the logic of the school finance decisions, it seems quite un-
likely that a court would sustain deviations supported by such an argu-
ment.145 Indeed, a court might be tempted to accept the state's claim
143. Serrano, also perhaps unintentionally, did recognize this issue, suggesting that
school lunches do not count as education, and raising the question whether school
swimming pools count, 5 Cal. 3d at 598 n.13, 609 n.26, 487 P.2d at 1251 n.16, 1258 n.26, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 610 n.13, 618-19 n.26. The Rodriguez approach is understandable, if, for no
other reason, because of the practical impossibility of judicial cost accounting supervision,
when rich districts tried to transfer "educational" expenses to "frill" accounts.
144. See note 132 supra. COLEMAN REPoRT, supra note 132, at 312, 316-19.
145. See pp. 441-45 supra.
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at face value and simply strike down the distribution scheme as irra-
tional. (By admitting that the added dollars are not buying achieve-
ment, however, the state would be effectively avowing a "wealth re-
distributive" legislative purpose and the real question is the permissi-
bility of this goal, though a court might still find the classification
irrational by recharacterizing the purpose.)'
4
1
But more likely, the courts would regard such a claim as a frontal
assault on the central Rodriguez premise that two educational tasks are
equal if they cost the same.147 And, as in Rodriguez, they would prob-
ably rely on the common wisdom or intuition that students are "better
educated" in smaller classes or by more experienced teachers. Over
time, social science may erode this common wisdom, and the courts
may have to ask themselves again, with some skepticism, whether for-
mal education really is a "fundamental" interest. Rodriguez and Ser-
rano would then be ripe for reversal. It is unlikely, however, that, hav-
ing just accepted the basic theory of those decisions, the courts will
allow the state to favor certain districts on the grounds that particular
resources-ostensibly educational-were in fact useless.
As the inquiry becomes more and more discreet, however, common
wisdom and intuition fade. It is also common wisdom, for example,
that some parents believe young and enthusiastic teachers are "better"
than elderly but more experienced ones. Even though the bald claim
that particular resources are useless is unlikely to succeed, the likely
appreciation of judges for this facet of the common wisdom may well
have some effect in conditioning their response to continued district
expenditure disparities.
C. Differences in the Cost of the Same Things
The Rodriguez premise that educational tasks are equal if their re-
source costs are equal, cannot be valid if districts must pay different
prices for the same resource. For example, if school district A, in which
publishing firms are located, can buy a particular book more cheaply
than rural school district B, a court cannot maintain that all deviations
from per pupil equality skew educational equality, unless it is willing
to believe that the same book is "better" in district B than in district A.
146. The rational relationship test is question.begging since every classification is
rationally related to its purpose, if the purpose is determined by reference to the words of
the classification actually employed in the statute. Statutes become "irrational" only
when the courts recharacterize their purpose. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality,
and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-38 (1972). But see Gunther, In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAav. L. RFv. 1 (1972), discussed briefly at note 122 supra.
147. See pp. 442-43 supra.
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If such differences in price are not reflected as a deviation in expendi-
tures, the state would have equalized dollars but not resources.
We can safely assume that Rodriguez, in using dollars as the meas-
ure of quality, did not mean to attach some intrinsic worth to green
pieces of paper, for "intrinsically" (apart from their purchasing power)
such pieces of paper bear no more relation to a district's resources (or
student achievement) than the number of leaves on its trees. It follows
that deviations from per pupil equality which correlate with district
wealth cannot be regarded as "wealth discriminatory" insofar as they
are based on differences among district costs for the same resources.
The courts, therefore, will almost certainly permit post-Rodriguez dis-
tribution formulas which adjust disbursements for such cost differen-
tials.
Whether the state will be constitutionally required to vary district
expenditures to reflect differences in resource costs depends on how the
courts define "wealth discrimination."'148 Even under decentralized
finance, if all the districts in a state had the same per pupil taxable
wealth and expenditures but some faced lower school resource prices
than others, these districts would be able to buy more resources. This
finance system might be characterized as making education a "func-
tion" of wealth (the Rodriguez formulation) by the argument that a
district's taxable wealth must be deflated (or inflated) by its school
resource prices to find its real wealth for educational purposes, i.e., its
ability to purchase education. If prices in one district are twenty-five
percent higher than in another, and if "wealth" in Rodriguez is a
shorthand for "ability to buy" or "purchasing power," the former dis-
trict is "poorer" and this finance system makes education a function
of wealth.
This line of argument would apply directly in challenges, on cost-
differential grounds, to post-Rodriguez power-equalized systems.
149
The comparable challenge to full state funding would be that the dis-
trict disbursements are "wealth discriminatory" unless they reflect dis-
trict price differences, because the state is by definition distributing
less purchasing power (i.e,, school resources) to "poor" (high cost) than
to "rich" (low cost) districts. Logically, the argument is persuasive,
since once we reject the "green pieces of paper" reading of Rodriguez
the real equalizing variable is plainly school resource purchasing power.
The courts may, however, be reluctant to refine the wealth discrimi-
148. See notes 115, 116, 117 supra.
149. Cf. note 151 infra.
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nation prohibition in this way. To build a constitutional prohibition
on other than the "formal equality" standard of dollars1 '0 might invite
challenges based on differential financial "capacity" and "sacrifice"
which, while possibly distinguishable, the courts might be very in-
clined to avoid.15 ' Rodriguez, by fairly clearly approving the Coons
version of power equalization, 15 2 suggests such an inclination: Two
districts taxing themselves at the same rate for the same expenditures
are not necessarily making an equal financial sacrifice. 153
Whether or not the courts require adjustments for price differences,
it seems unimaginable that they will prohibit them. While inter-dis-
trict differences in the prices of books may be de minimus, it is far
from clear that differences in the "prices" districts must pay for teach-
ers are insignificant. Current inter-district differences in per pupil ex-
penditures are largely explained by differences in teacher costs per
pupill 54-differences presumably reflecting in part the fact that teach-
ers systematically charge more for working in certain districts.
These differences are reflected in variations among the salary sched-
ules of districts. Evaluating their importance is difficult, in the first
place, because the most readily available data show only teacher salary
per pupil, and this reflects not only differences among salary schedules,
but also differences in pupil-teacher ratios and in the relative propor-
tion of teachers at the upper end of the schedule.
The Urban Institute study suggests that differences in pupil-teacher
ratios are not a very significant factor, except between "rich" and
"poor" suburbs.155 A modest study of my own, using data from the
150. For a discussion of "formal equality" see Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HARv. L. Rav. 1160-76 (1969).
151. In particular, the courts might be wary of relative fiscal capacity claims based
on "municipal overburden." See note 44 supra. Municipal overburden challenges to a
power-equalized system would, in principle, be very similar to high educational cost
challenges, since both would focus upon the definition of "wealth" and thus a dis-
trict's ability to buy educational resources. Municipal overburden challenges to full
state funding, however, would, under my interpretation of Rodriguez, be distinguish-
able from high educational cost challenges. If the state distribution formula takes ac-
count of school resource cost differences, all districts will have equal purchasing power
for these resources and that is all the decision requires. Municipal overburden, in this
circumstance, is simply a taxpayers* inequity, and as such irrelevant, under my view of
Rodriguez. See note 140 supra.
152. See note 22 supra. The decision clearly permits "fiscl neutrality," adopting the
Coons, formulation of this principle, but does not expressly approve any particular
system. 337 F. Supp. at 284. It seems quite unlikely, however, that the courts would
permit power equalization but require a "progressive" rate schedule (e.g., one that
would count the ten mil tax of poorer districts as equal to the twenty ml tax of
richer ones), since there are no standards for determining the appropriate progression.
153. See note 152 supra.
154. See notes 17 & 33 supra.
155. URBAN INsrrrtrE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, PRE. ,r DisPAnrms AND FLtcAL AL.
TRNATVnEs 90-91 (1972).
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largest districts in Florida and California, suggests that only thirty per-
cent to thirty-five percent of teacher salary per pupil variation is ex-
plained by differences in teacher experiences and education. 1 1 Thus,
if we accept, even with considerable reservation, the Urban Institute's
basic finding on pupil-teacher ratios, the inference is that variations
among the salary schedule themselves-differences in prices paid for
the "same quality" teachers-accounts for a very significant part of the
variation in inter-district teacher costs per pupil.', 7 Another recent
study conducted for a California Senate Committee suggests, however,
that pupil-teacher ratios are important in 'that state. Nevertheless, it in-
dicates that roughly twenty-five percent of teacher cost differences are
related to differences in district teacher "prices" in elementary and
unified school districts.'58 These studies at least tentatively suggest that
in today's teacher market a considerable part of the district disparities
in per pupil expenditures is attributable to differences in teacher
prices.
Of course, although we have attempted to control for differences
due to variable pupil-teacher ratios and to different experience and
education of teachers some part of this "price" differential may still
reflect quality differences. Both common sense and social science indi-
cate that two teachers may have the same experience and education,
but one may still be a better teacher. 5 9 Current "high-price" districts
may simply be hiring these teachers, and to the extent that wealthy
districts tend to be "high-price" ones a cost-differential might simply
perpetuate this wealth advantage.
Moreover, even if cost-differentials did not perpetuate the advantage
of wealthy districts in hiring "high quality" teachers, if based on exist-
ing salary patterns they might simply subsidize powerful local teacher,
organizations, since some part of existing salary disparities may repre.
156. A regression model was employed on three independent variables and 97 data
points. There was, however, no control for variations in pupil-teacher ratios.
157. Although not necessarily very probative, it is interesting that the Urban In.
stitute also found that approximately seventy percent of the inter-state variation in
teacher salary per pupil (between New York and North Carolina) reflected differences
in the salary schedules themselves. URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE: I'RESENT
DISPARITIES AND FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 104 (1972).
158. This study found very little "price" differences among high school districts,
however. See I CAL. SENATE SELECT CoMmITrEE ON SCHOOL DISTRICT FINANCE, FINAL REIORT
36, Table 111-2 (1972).
159. The Coleman Report, for example, found some relationship between teacher
verbal ability and student performance on a verbal ability test. COLEMAN REPORT, supra
note 132, at 316. Another study found that the quality of teachers' undergraduate schools
is significantly related to student verbal ability, Wlnkler, The Production of Human
Capital: A Study of Minority Achievement (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley, 1972), cited in I SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON SCHOOL DISTRIeT
FINANCE, FINAL REPORT 33 (1972). See also J. GUTIIRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H1. LEVIN & R.
STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY 65-90 (1971).
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sent differential union power.'60 If a court could be persuaded that a
cost-differential amounted solely to such a subsidy, it would have no
reason to invalidate it even if it resulted in disparities related to district
wealth. Such a subsidy would present a unique variant of the "useless
resource" problem, since no common wisdom or intuition suggests that
additional compensation for union strength has anything to do with
educational quality.' 0 '
The difficulty, however, is that for all practical purposes it will be
impossible to separate the relative influence on district salary levels of:
(1) wealth-advantaged purchases of higher quality teachers; (2) differ-
ential union strength; and (3) different prices for the same quality
teachers. No matter how powerful the teacher union, some part of the
higher teacher prices paid by a district may well reflect factors one and
three as well. In theory, special subsidy for the first factor should be
forbidden by Rodriguez, while subsidy for the third should be per-
mitted, or even required. Yet the measurement problems will prevent
such fine cost-accounting.
This is the core of the "cost-quality" paradox which will be most
troublesome and yet practically important in the post-Rodriguez world.
Separating the effects of union power would require a supply schedule,
giving the "will work" price for each teacher and potential teacher in
the state, in whatever the relevant teacher market. Realistically this
calculation will probably have to be made from data on existing dis-
trict expenditures, but such data may reflect quality differences. Cost
indicators external to education, such as general cost of living indexes
or local teacher-competitive wage scales, are presumably free of taint
and may prove helpful, but they pose data collection and interpreta-
tion problems and, more importantly, tell us only a portion of what
we need to know.0 2 Perhaps social scientists can develop taint-free
measurement devices, but the obvious difficulties of controlling for
quality and union power differences makes this problematic.
The non-measurability of the variables presents the courts with a
dilemma. If they do permit cost-differentials based to some extent on
existing salaries, they risk a perpetuation of wealth-related quality ad-
160. See, e.g., URBAN INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE, PRnsEuI-r DISPAITIES AND
FISCAL ALTERNATIVES 96 (1972).
161. See note 158 supra.
162. Cost of living indexes typically compare data between SMSA's (Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas), not between suburbs and cities within these areas, nor between
school districts. Moreover, cost of living differences are not the only factor affecting
teacher locational preferences. Teacher preferences are probably significantly influenced
by factors like the condition of school buildings, the "atmosphere" of the school, the
calibre of teacher colleagues, the character of the student body, the pupil.teacher ratio,
and the general "reputation" of the school system.
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vantage. If they do not, however, they may set teacher prices too low
for truly high cost districts to compete. Moreover, the possibility that
union-related costs may increase the prices that some districts must pay
for the same teachers confounds the problem.
Presently the cost of teachers is often determined through collective
bargaining, not a perfectly competitive market. Whether a district faces
high costs because teachers find its living costs high, or its living or
working conditions unattractive, or because the union it confronts is
comparatively powerful, the fact remains that it is still paying more for
the "same" teachers. A legislature should be permitted to take such fac-
tors into account in distributing funds; and if the courts require recog-
nition of cost-differentials this should certainly be one of the required
adjustments.
At the same time, however, it would be absurd for a court to require
or a legislature to allow additional disbursements to a district merely
because the union had won an increase in salaries. With full state fund-
ing, or near full state funding, such a policy could easily convert col-
lective bargaining into a giveaway for teachers, for the local board
would have little reason to resist union demands.
Yet, if-when state funding is instituted-local salaries continue to be
set in local bargaining, a state policy of ignoring union-created district
disparities in the salaries of the "same" teachers would also be foolish.
Salary concessions won by the union would deprive local students of
funds that could otherwise go for books, buildings, programs, or more
or better teachers, and the local board and its constituents will be
powerless to raise replacement funds through local taxation. 0 3 To be
sure, this latter absurdity would not exist under power equalization,
but a state policy of ignoring the effects of differential union power
would nevertheless produce and validate large differences in the effec-
tive purchasing power of equal-wealth districts, thus again undermin-
ing the apparent rationale of Rodriguez.0 4 The courts may thus be
put to a Hobson's choice of accepting this effective undermining of
their decisions or requiring a senseless teacher giveway.
Put briefly, the Rodriguez doctrine is inconsistent with setting
163. We have previously argued that current expenditures, apart from teacher salaries,
are very non-manipulable and we then noted that capital costs might be more so but
that little is known about these. See note 36 supra. If we were wrong as to the first
argument or if capital costs really are very manipulable, this local bargaining.cost
differential paradox may prove very important indeed. Assuming we were correct, the
practical problem should be relatively small under full state funding, though probably
greater in the long run under power equalization, but in any event the important
question is how "small" it will be.
164. See note 163 supra.
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teacher salaries through local collective bargaining. Thus, the political
movement toward state bargaining predicted above is fortunate for the
doctrinal coherence of the decisions which should precipitate it.
If, as we have predicted, the political or central bargaining process
itself generates cost-differential distribution formulas, the courts' role
will probably be limited to reviewing them for "accuracy."'u ° If cost-
differentials are not so generated, true high-price districts will suffer
a competitive disadvantage, and, the likelihood of the courts constitu-
tionally compelling recognition of these differences may well depend
less on a careful consideration of the meaning of "wealth discrimina-
tion" than on whether, as folklore and intuition suggest, central cities
face particularly high teacher costs.
The courts obviously are not well equipped to evaluate the eviden-
tiary issues involved in assessing teacher cost-differentials, and this will
undercut the effectiveness of judicially required differentials just as
it will limit the review of legislatively enacted or collectively bargained
ones.'66 Given political probabilities, however, the latter seems much
more likely than the former to be a practically important problem. And
on this issue the courts might well decide to use the uncertainty inher-
ent in the cost-quality question to mediate their own conflicting intui-
tions on the extent to which costs affect achievements, and more im-
portantly, to accommodate the Rodriguez doctrine to the political
forces that will dominate a post-Rodriguez world.
D. Different Costs for Different Things
Assessing adequately the legality of post-Rodriguez distribution
schemes providing aid for a wide range of special purposes would re-
quire an extended analysis of both intractible normative issues and
165. In Michigan, the Governor's proposals for revising the school finance system,
initiated before Serrano and Rodriguez, employed school staff-pupil ratios rather than
per pupil expenditures as the equalizing variable. The proposed state funded system
would take account of both salary level differences (on the basis of fifty-nine cost-
regions, each containing several school districts) and each districts teacher training and
experience. According to the analysis of this article, the former "cost-differential" (re-
flecting price differences) would be constitutionally permissible, subject to the measure-
ment ambiguity, while the latter would be constitutionally impermissible (if it re-
suited in wealth-correlated expenditure variations). We should note, though, that the
courts might permit the latter kind of adjustment for a period of years as a con-
cession to gradual compliance. BUatsu OF PROGRAMS AND BUDcET, SCHOOL FLNANcE RE-
FORM IN MICHIGAN 56-64, app. II 13, 15-16 (1972).
166. In Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), the court prohibited
intra-district expenditure variations for elementary schools and decreed that no more
than five percent variations from the city-wide average would be constitutionally accept-
able. Id. at 863-64. The intra- and inter-district situations are obviously not comparable,
however, since all schools in the district pay teachers according to the district salary
schedule. Cf. note 95 supra.
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administrative practices. We shall attempt here to shed some light on
this problem by calling attention to, but not discussing the normative
issues, and without considering the possible defects in and challenges
to the actual administration of such categorical and special programs.
Perhaps the most important problems concern "categorical" aid-
special state grants for compensatory or "gifted" student education, or
vocational or science programs-to which all districts are entitled, but
only to the extent they have "eligible" students; and special adminis-
tratively dispensed aid for "innovative" programs and the like, which
is granted to particular districts according to the merits of their pro-
posed program. We shall discuss only the former, but the issues pre-
sented by the latter are not significantly different.
Eligibility criteria for categorical aid might depend on student
"tastes" or "needs" or "abilities," none of which are likely to be dis-
tributed in equal proportion throughout districts in the state.107 Thus,
program expenditures will vary among districts, and might result in
wealth-correlated deviations in overall per pupil expenditures. The
initial question is whether any potential wealth discrimination claim
could be avoided, as in the case of district cost differentials, on the
ground that such deviations merely reflect differences in the "cost" of
education.0 8 The answer would appear to be no.
We have seen that the Rodriguez assumption that educational tasks
are equal when their costs are equal, permits an exception where dis-
tricts pay different prices for the same resources.100 However, it does
167. This claim is based much more on intuition than data, since there appear to
be no data reliably reporting the distribution among different wealth districts, of
student needs, talents and tastes. Title I distribution is based not on educational need
criteria but on low income families. See note 171 infra. The Coleman Report found
regional (as well as racial) differences in participation in vocational courses, ranging
for white students from nine percent in the Metropolitan South to nineteen percent
in the Nonmetropolitan Non-South, and for blacks, from seventeen percent in the
Non-metropolitan South to twenty-eight percent in the Metropolitan Non.South. The
Report makes clear, however, that these figures probably reflect the availability of
programs as well as student tastes. COLEMAN REPORT, supra note 132, at 545.
168. A recently brought suit in Florida challenges the state school finance system
as a denial of equal protection on the basis of alleged educational cost differences be-
tween rural and urban districts. The complaint fuses together without differentiation
a claim of higher costs (within our usage) of the same resources (teachers, capital
costs, maintenance) and a claim of special goals or priorities (educating "culturally
different" and "socially and economically deprived children"). Dade County Classroom
Teachers' Assoc. v. State Bd. of Educ., circuit court, Leon County, Florida, No. 71-1687
(amended complaint, pp. 11-15).
169. See p. 448. We have focused on teacher salary differences, but the same
price differential analysis is applicable to all school resources which are ultimately held
to count as "education." Some cost difference claims do not fall clearly within what
we have called different costs of the "same" or "different" things. We shall not ana-
lyze these systematically, but consider, as an illustration, inter.district differences In
the cost of transporting children to school. Differences in the salaries of bus drivers
and the costs of buses, maintenance, fuel and the like are clearly different costs of
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not permit an exception when the claim is that some students or pro-
grams are more costly than others, because this would reopen the
Mclnnis problem of comparing incomparable educational achieve-
ments and tasks. Thus, in Rodriguez, $1000 of physics equals $1000
of vocational educational education equals $1000 of reading instruction
for slow learners or for fast learners.17 One task is more "costly" than
another only when more educational resources are devoted to it. And
in generating inter-district disparities through special program aid,
the state is therefore not taking account of district cost differentials
but is creating the differences by its choice of educational goals and
priorities. Of course, the case for providing special money for slow
learners is strong, but even there, such students are more costly to
educate only as a result of a prior decision, namely, that they ought
to learn more than they have been learning. Geography would also be
very costly if we decided that every student should travel around the
world.
Since categorical aid cannot be accommodated under the Rodriguez
theory as a cost-differential, it cannot be constitutionally required un-
der that theory and any resulting wealth-related expenditure dispari-
ties which the courts regard as a "wealth classification" would have to
serve some "compelling state interest" in order to survive constitu-
tional attack. It seems likely that both politics and educational policy
judgments may result in special subsidies for both compensatory and
high-achievement programs which will disproportionately benefit the
relatively "rich" cities and suburbs. Moreover, attacks on categorical
aid could also be based on alleged family wealth classifications. Thus,
a formula for aiding gifted students that defined the "gifted" as those
the same thing. But what of cost variations due to inter-district geographical or traffic
pattern differences? These do not present the educational priority choice and com-
parability problems associated with different costs of different things, see p. 412 supra
and note 170 infra, and are probably properly regarded, like teacher salar) dif-
ferences, as differences in resource costs. The cost variations, in other w ords, are dif-
ferent costs of student resources.
170. See p. 442. The comparability problem has both a "horizontal" and a "ver-
tical" dimension. Thus, the claim may be that some achievements and therefore
tasks are more costly for all students (horizontal), or that some students are more costli
to teach particular achievements (vertical). In both instances, howe~er, the "high-cost"
claim rests on a prior educational goal or priority claim. The relative cost of teaching
science, for example, depends on whether its achievement goals are limited to teaching
students to dissect frogs or include teaching them to btild and operate computers,
just as the relative costs of teaching reading to slow and fast learners depends on the
reading achievement goals for both categories of students. If a court wishes to find
that one kind of program or student is more "costly" than another, therefore, it cannot
avoid making educational goal priority choices. Even if we assume this is an ac-
acceptable judicial function, a court would need some standard of "equalit)" (presumably,
other than sameness of achievement for all students) against which financing systems
might be tested for compliance. Compare with note 169 supra.
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from rich families would presumably be challenged as a de jure wealth
classification, as might a compensatory formula which, like Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, is based on children
from low income families. 171 The courts would presumably distin-
guish between these formulas, just as they have distinguished between
"invidious" and "benevolent" racial classifications. 172  They might
reach this result by holding only the former "suspect" (given the ap-
parent point of Rodriguez and of the general doctrine, to the extent
that there is one, that "wealth is a suspect classification"), 173 or by find-
ing them both wealth classifications but upholding the latter as serving
a compelling interest.
De jure classifications are just the tip of the iceberg, however, for
compensatory or special achievement subsidies, even if eligibility is
defined in terms of apparently neutral criteria like test scores, might
be challenged as de facto discriminations in favor of children from
"rich" and "poor" families. Coherently articulating and proving a de
facto family wealth impact claim would be difficult, given that wealth is
a continuum and that there are no apparent standards for determining
how much of a wealth correlation is too much. Even if we assume that
171. Title I funds are distributed under a formula based substantially upon the
number of students "in families receiving an annual income of less than the low.income
factor," which, for the fiscal year ending June, 1973, is $4,000. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241c(a)(17(B )(2)(A), 241c(c7.
172. See, e.g., Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ca.),
a! 'd, 410 F.2d 1152, 410 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1969), petition for rehearing denied, 410
F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1969); Tometz v. Bd. of Educ., 39 Il1. 2d 593, 600, 237 N.E.2d 498,
502 (1968); School Com. of Boston v. Bd. of Educ., 352 Mass. 693, 698-700, 227 NE.2d
729, 733-34 (1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968). See also Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1108 n.190 (1969); Note, A Statistical
Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81
YALE L.J. 1303, 1319 n.75 (1972).
173. None of the prior cases involving alleged "sliding scale" fundamental Interest-
wealth classifications, see note 6 supra, has involved a discrimination "in favor of" the
rich, unless a discrimination against the poor is regarded as necessarily "favoring" the
rich. Nevertheless, a distribution formula based on the number of high income families
would presumably be more offensive than the current system, which classifies not by
wealth but by district ability to pay. See notes 115, 116, 117 supra. (Could the state pay
minimal scheduled rates for lawyers for indigents while fully reimbursing all privately
incurred costs for defendants whose income exceeds $20,000? And is a de jure pro-
rich educational aid formula distinguishable because wealth bears some (though a
far from perfect) relationship to student performance?)
Pro-poor de jure classifications, by comparison, are compelled by the very cases that
are often cited for the proposition that wealth is a suspect classification. In order
to assure that indigent criminal defendants are provided with appellate counsel, for
example, the state can obviously enact a statute keyed to defendants with less than a
given income or who are unable to pay market prices. Similarly, it would seem, the
point of the "wealth discrimination" prohibition in Rodriguez is to prevent district
poverty from impairing the educational achievements of students, not to assure a
regime of "wealth-blindness" in educational finance. See notes 115, 116, 117 supra,
& note 174 infra.
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the world is clearly divisible into three parts-the "poor," the "middle
class," and the "rich"--can we say that a formula which channels, say
sixty percent of its aid to any one of these classes is disproportionate
enough to be considered discriminatory? Moreover, it is not clear
whether a rich-poor balance of aid becomes non-discriminatory even
though the middle class is disadvantaged.17 4
De facto discrimination claims, whether based on district or family
wealth will in any event encounter substantial state justifications. It
seems extremely likely that a court, either by further explicating the
normative basis of Rodriguez or by a simple appraisal of social reality,
would find compensatory and other "pro-poor" aid either not what is
meant by a "wealth classification" or justified by some compelling state
interest. The more substantial question would concern "pro-rich" aid,
such as advanced-placement college courses. Courts have invalidated
school testing and tracking on racial discrimination grounds, and par-
ticular tests and administrative practices associated with such special
aid programs might prove vulnerable to this kind of attack.27 i But the
courts have side.stepped the fundamental question: the power of the
state to nurture talent or excellence which is largely a function of fam-
ily wealth or social class. Courts typically prefer to avoid value choices
at this fundamental level, but if pressed, it seems unlikely that they will
forbid the legislature to decide that the social welfare is served by
nurturing "talent" or by "efficiently" producing more and better doc-
tors, engineers, or playwrights.
Nor will a claim that the legislature intended or was motivated by
a desire to aid rich families or districts necessarily avoid this problem.
Proof problems aside 76 the model of a legislature carefully determin-
ing which students or programs to subsidize in order to frustrate Rod-
riguez may bear only partial correspondence to the real world. It may
be that the educational priorities embodied in the very district dis-
174. See note 173 supra. Even if Title I type de jure pro-poor classifications were
held unconstitutional because of the over- and under-exclusiveness of family wealth
as a measure of educational need, this problem could be eliminated by a formula based
on low test scores and the like, which is pro-poor only in impact. But the balance of
rich-poor aid presents a more complex issue.
175. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aJJ'd sub flom. Smuck v.
Hansen, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); George v. O'Kelly, 448 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir.
1971). But see Miller v. School Dist. No. 2, Clarendon Co., 256 F. Supp. 370 (D.S.C. 1966).
Cf. Arrington v. Mass. Bay Transportation Authority, 506 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Mass.
1969) (invalidating "racially biased" aptitude tests in determining job promotions).
176. See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Molivation in Constitutional Law, 79
YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21, 1267 (1970); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal
Protection, 82 YA.E L.J. 123, 142 (1972).
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parities that Rodriguez prohibits (and those set within districts by
"tracking" and its variants) are those which state legislatures favor and
will wish to perpetuate. That is, some part of current expenditure dis-
parities may reflect the different costs of different educational goals,
and the real question remains whether and to what extent these goals
are constitutionally permissible.
While predicting how the courts would weigh these difficult norma-
tive issues is hazardous, what can be predicted is that they will have
very little taste for the endeavor. The prospect of having to balance
excellence and efficiency against equalitarianism might itself make the
courts reluctant to prohibit mere wealth-expenditure correlations and
might induce them to steer clear of motivational analysis, save in out-
rageous cases where a "perpetuation" motive is absolutely clear, that is,
where expenditure patterns cannot be reasonably explained on any
other than perpetuation grounds.177 But categorical aid and other spe-
cial subsidies (e.g., for innovative or experimental programs)"78 should
not fall in this category, and their probable effective immunization
from judicial review makes them another likely legislative device for
political accommodation .17
177. Thus, the legislature probably could not decree, irrespective of the distribution
of student needs, talents, and tastes, that some districts should have science, history,
or physical education programs while others should not, or that some should have
better programs than others. If the legislature has this kind of discretion-to set dif.
ferent achievement goals for different districts and call this a difference in the cost
of education-it has absolute power to manipulate inter-district expenditure variations
in any way that it sees fit. Putting aside the special case of experimental program
grants to particular localities, a court would probably have little difficulty checking
this kind of naked manipulation. It could probably not even survive the rational re-
lationship test, since little could be said in explanation without admitting that its
purpose is the perpetuation of that which Rodriguez prohibits.
178. Special state subsidies for innovative or experimental programs present another
problem. This kind of aid is typically distributed not automatically under a formula but
by local application to a central administration (e.g., the State Department of Education)
which determines whether to subsidize the program, on the basis of its apparent merit.
Programs of this sort provide another avenue for perpetuating inter-district wealth.
related expenditure disparities, and for political accommodation. But they cannot be
subjected to the same rule of "geographical neutrality" likely to apply to categorical aid,
see note 177 supra, since the point of the kind of aid is to support programs for-
mulated by particular districts that seem validly innovative or experimental. Again, ju-
dicial review is likely to be minimal, probably involving a "bona fide" test. The issue
will essentially be one of motivational analysis, and it will probably turn on whether
the distribution of such aid follows a pattern of refusing support for poor district
programs while approving support for similar rich district programs.
179. The political utility of categorical aid may be somewhat limited by a probable
rule of geographical neutrality, see note 177 supra, but the practical effect of this liil-
tation depends on the eligibility criteria and the distribution among districts of eligible
students. See note 167 supra. Special aid for innovative or experimental programs may
be somewhat easier to manipulate for political purposes, although the courts will
probably not tolerate blatant favoritism for rich districts. See note 178 supra.
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Conclusion
This article has not addressed the institutional issue of whether the
courts ought to intervene Rodriguez-style in school finance. Rather,
we have attempted to assess the impact of Rodriguez by focusing on
teacher organizations and collective bargaining-two elements which
are crucial to the school finance decisions but which have been hereto-
fore largely ignored by courts and commentators alike. Our consistent
theme has been that the probable results of implementing the decision
will be far more complicated than either its advocates or critics have
claimed.
We have suggested that implementation will trigger political con-
flict and accommodation in which teacher organizations will play a
major role; that this process will utilize cost-differentials and special
program aid to reintroduce expenditure disparities; and that the courts
will probably prove unwilling or unable to condemn most of these dis-
parities on Equal Protection grounds. We have further suggested that a
more active judicial role would carry not only the possible (though
remote) danger of institutional confrontation but also of incorrect
teacher price-setting and of constitutionalizing educational policy.
Thus, whether one regards the "first step" of Rodriguez as an appro-
priate or inappropriate exercise of judicial review, the more palpable
dangers of "activism" will come in its implementation, where, para-
doxically, the courts will probably play a relatively "passive" role.
We have also contended that ultimately expenditure disparities will
be moderated, though not entirely eliminated, by the development of
state-wide collective bargaining. We have predicted that centralized
bargaining will simultaneously tend to assimilate non-revenue and edu-
cational policy issues, a possibility which must be kept in mind when
establishing new rules for the process.
Finally, centralization of decision-making at the state level, together
with increased pressure against "wasting" public money, may lead to
a more thorough and professional analysis of educational costs, meth-
ods, and goals. However, it is less clear that the wisdom and folly of
local school boards will not simply be exchanged for the wisdom and
folly of technocrats. Yet the trends toward centralization of bargaining
and the "technocratization" of education are already in the winds, and
Rodriguez will thus not significantly alter the course of American
social history.
And so the question remains: Who will gain from the decisions? One
is left with a feeling of unease over the likely acceleration of state bar-
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gaining, with a lingering suspicision that the teachers may be its pri-
mary beneficiary and, most importantly, with an impression that
neither a Supreme Court affirmance nor reversal in Rodriguez is likely
to affect substantially the achievement of children in the public
schools. Certainly, the implementation of Rodriguez will not cure the
sickness that has led to, or remedy the deprivations that result from,
racial segregation in the schools. Indeed, if the courts, legislatures, or
public come to view Rodriguez as a "way out" of our racial dilemma,
the cause of "equality of educational opportunity" will have been
tragically disserved.
